Provided by Cognitive Sciences ePrint Archive
Connectionism, Analogicity and Mental Content
Gerard O’Brien
Department of Philosophy
University of Adelaide
South Australia 5005
http://arts.adelaide.edu.au/Philosophy/gobrien.htm
Draft @ August 1997
Appeared in Acta Analytica 22: 111-31 (1998)
Abstract
In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson (1996) argue that cognitive
processes, pace classicism, are not governed by exceptionless, “representation-level” rules; they
are instead the work of defeasible cognitive tendencies subserved by the non-linear dynamics of
the brain’s neural networks. Many theorists are sympathetic with the dynamical characterisation
of connectionism and the general (re)conception of cognition that it affords. But in all the
excitement surrounding the connectionist revolution in cognitive science, it has largely gone
unnoticed that connectionism adds to the traditional focus on computational processes, a new
focus - one on the vehicles of mental representation, on the entities that carry content through the
mind. Indeed, if Horgan and Tienson’s dynamical characterisation of connectionism is on the
right track, then so intimate is the relationship between computational processes and
representational vehicles, that connectionist cognitive science is committed to a resemblance
theory of mental content.
1. Introduction
In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Terrence Horgan and John Tienson (henceforth
H&T) set out to develop a comprehensive characterisation of connectionism that both marks it as
a rival to its classical predecessor and explains why it is superior (1996). The result is a
framework they call dynamical cognition, a conception of mind at whose heart is the rejection of
the discrete mathematics of digital computation in favour of the fundamentally continuous
mathematics of dynamical systems theory. Cognitive processes, pace classicism, are not
governed by precise, exceptionless, “representation-level” rules; they are instead the work of
defeasible cognitive tendencies subserved by the non-linear dynamics of the brain’s neural
networks.
Along with many theorists, I am sympathetic with the dynamical characterisation of
connectionism and the general (re)conception of cognition that it affords. What is more, I am
especially sympathetic with H&T’s focus on “content-appropriate” cognitive forces, physically
realised as complex patterns of network activation and connectivity, competing and combining
with one another to determine the temporal evolution of cognitive behaviour (1996, chp.4). This,
I believe, is the proper treatment of connectionism. But revolutions often have unforeseen
consequences - consequences that even those in the vanguard fail to appreciate. And in the case
of the connectionist revolution in cognitive science, one major consequence has largely gone
unnoticed. This is that connectionist cognitive science is committed to a distinctly old-fashioned