Children's Attributions 4
Children’s attributions of beliefs to humans and god: cross-cultural evidence
1. Introduction
Humans routinely attribute intentions, beliefs, and desires in order to interpret the
behavior of others. Other humans are seen as agents, that is, as entities that pursue goals in
accordance with their beliefs and desires. Attributions of agency are so ubiquitous that they are
typically taken for granted in everyday life. These attributions are not always correct in
identifying the beliefs and desires that underlie a specific action of an agent; yet, if people did
not see others as agents, the capacity to understand their behavior would be severely impaired
(for example, people would be surprised when others got up and moved).
Abundant research documents children’s acquisition of human agent concepts over the
first several years of life (Astington, Harris, & Olson, 1988; Perner, 1993; Wellman, 1990), but
there is little work available on the development of non-human agent concepts. Yet, people often
attribute intentions, beliefs, and desires to animals as well as to ghosts, gods, demons, and
monsters. Scholars have long assumed that children first acquire concepts of human agency and
then use them as templates to understand all nonhuman agents. One exception in this regard is
found in the work of Barrett and collaborators (Barrett, Richert, & Driesenga, 2001; Richert &
Barrett, 2003; see also Atran, 2002, for an evolutionary account of why children cognize
nonhuman agency).
In this article, we offer further support for Barrett’s point of view, showing that Yukatek
children do not reason in the same way about the agency of humans and God since early on in
development. In the first part, we discuss the development of human agent concepts, specifically