(11) then God would have not maximised the development of human qualities From (10)
(12) then God would not be a perfect being From (11)
(13) .∙. if we had a proof of God's existence then God would not be a perfect being From (7) and (12)
(14) .∙. if we had a sound ontological argument then God would not be a perfect being From (4) and (13)
It should be noted that the above argument has the general form of a reductio ad absurdum. It starts with the
hypothesis that we have a proof of God's existence at our disposal and derives a contradiction with the fact that
God is a perfect being. An immediate consequence of the argument is that ontological arguments fail. For if a
sound ontological argument was available, it would contradict the fact that God has all of the perfections. Thus,
the availability of a successful ontological argument would be in contradiction with the very nature of God.
At this step, it is worth mentioning briefly some characteristic features of the above argument. It should be
emphasised, first, that the argument rests on a specific property of our physical world. In effect, our present
world allows for the development of faith, since no proof of God's existence is currently available. This
constitutes an empirical fact. It should be added that premise (2) is also based on empirical data. For the evidence
that humans are not perfect beings is currently available. The current argument appears thus, to the difference of
ontological arguments, based8 on empirical facts.
It should be observed, second, that the argument contrasts the perfect nature of God and the imperfect nature of
human beings. In effect, premise (1) states the perfect nature of God and premise (2) underlines the imperfect
nature of human beings. More generally, the argument emphasises the relationships of God and humankind.
Lastly, it is worth defining accurately the scope of the current argument. The argument is for the impossibility
of a sound ontological argument. It concerns ontological arguments intended in the classical sense, considered as
a special case of proof of God's existence. What the argument entails is the impossibility for an ontological
argument to provide a definitive proof of God's existence, namely a line of reasoning yielding certainty. But
what the argument does not deny is the possibility allowed to ontological argument to simply increase9 one's
faith or to strengthen one's initial belief in God's existence. In conclusion, the above argument leaves room for a
form of ontological arguments that would only produce a shift in one's prior subjective probability concerning
the existence of God10.
References
ANSELM, St. Proslogion, in St. Anselm's Proslogion. M. Charlesworth (ed.), Oxford: OUP, 1965
DESCARTES, R. 1642. Meditations on First Philosophy. Translated in J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D.
Murdoch. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Vol. 2, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1984
KANT, I. 1787. Critique of Pure Reason, second edition. Translated by N. Kemp-Smith. London: Macmillan, 1933
MALCOLM, N. 1960. Anselm's Ontological Arguments. Philosophical Review 69: 41-62
OPPY, G. 1995. Ontological Arguments and Belief in God. New York: Cambridge University Press
OPPY, G. 1996. Ontological Arguments. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments
PLANTINGA, A. 1974. The Nature of Necessity, Oxford: Oxford University Press