Vol. 47, No. 2
Case Note
269
(Im)partial court?
A sad and shameful aspect of this case is that the Court of Appeal was
blatantly more concerned with “justice” for the prosecution than with the
human rights of the accused. For, although, as noted above, the Court
appeared to be complaining that both sides had been cheated, it is clear
that the court was more concerned with ``fairness'' to the prosecution. Thus
the court completely ignored the serious abuse of power committed by the
prosecuting authorities who had disobeyed a court order and violated the
human rights of the accused by keeping them in detention without lawful
excuse. It is interesting to note that the Court of Appeal did not dispute the
fact that the Procureur General, the head of the Legal Department in the
province, gave instructions that the order of the magistrate (that the defen-
dants be released on bail) should not be obeyed. Nor did the court deny that
the action of the Procureur General amounted to a violation of the defen-
dants' right to the presumption of innocence and their right not to be detained
without lawful excuse. Yet nowhere in the judgment of the Court of Appeal
can one ®nd even a hint of disapproval of this outrageous conduct of the
prosecuting authorities.
This is a case where the prosecuting authorities violated basic human rights
and trampled upon the rule of law. Instead of refusing to countenance such
dangerous behaviour, as the magistrate did, the judges in the Court of Appeal
have, by their silence, condoned it. Indeed, it is not too much to say that, by
their deliberate failure to act, the judges in the Court of Appeal have parti-
cipated in the misconduct of the executive; they have colluded in the human
rights violations inflicted upon the defendants.
Why, it may be asked, were the judges in the Court of Appeal so blatantly
partial towards the executive? The answer, it is suggested, lies in the lack of
judicial independence in Cameroon.15 It is no secret that the system of
appointment, promotion, and transfer of judges in Cameroon is one which
ensures that judges are at the mercy of the executive and therefore extremely
vulnerable to pressure from the executive.16 As one human rights NGO has
stated,17 the judiciary in Cameroon “lacks independence'' and is “vulnerable
to political influence''. And there is little doubt that the two cases under
comment are cases in which the executive was particularly interested because
of its signi®cant political implications. The Government has long been
anxious to counteract the political activities of the movement (the SCNC18)
of which the defendants were members. This movement has been campaign-
ing for secession of the Southern Cameroons from the Republic of Cameroon.
And the demonstrations which led to the arrests of the defendants were
demonstrations calling for or celebrating the separate statehood of Southern
Cameroons. It appears that the Government had attempted, through the
15 The practice is very different from what is proclaimed in Article 37(2) of the Constitution
that the judiciary ``shall be independent of the executive and legislative powers''.
16 The source of this judicial submissiveness to the executive is Article 37(3) of the Constitution
which puts the absolute and unfettered power to appoint, promote, and discipline judges all in the
hands of the President of the Republic, the head of the executive arm of the state.
17 Human Rights Watch, Report on Cameroon, at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/africa/
cameroon/cameroon.html.
18 Short for, “Southern Cameroons National Council''.