Vol. 47, No. 2
Case Note
273
allow the prosecution so much extra time to prepare and ®le their counter-
af®davit, in the full knowledge that in the meantime the applicants remained
in detention. The judges of the Court of Appeal were not worried by the long
period that the applicants had spent in detention without charge because the
judges had already concluded that the applicants were guilty. It is not too
much to say that by presuming the applicants guilty and refusing them bail as
a result, the learned judges of the Court of Appeal were colluding with the
Legal Department to use pre-trial detention as a punishment.
The use of pre-trial detention as punishment is not uncommon in
Cameroon. As Sir Nigel Rodley, the U.N. Special Rapporteur, has
observed,27 it is common knowledge that in Cameroon pre-trial detention is
widely used by the executive (police and prosecuting authorities) as a form of
punishment rather than for its primary goal of upholding order and security
or facilitating investigations. This is disturbing and has already been justly
condemned elsewhere.28 What is more worrying about this decision of the
Court of Appeal is that it indicates that senior members of the judiciary are
now willing to participate in this appalling violation of human rights.
Conclusion
The judgment of the Court of Appeal in the Nya Henry case is not only
devoid of legal basis, it constitutes a threat to the rule of law and to basic
human rights. For it takes away from the judiciary an important weapon in
their limited armoury designed to promote the rule of law and protect basic
human rights. The decision is likely to encourage executive agents of the state
to continue to oppress ordinary citizens by abusing the coercive functions of
the court. It is therefore hoped that this disgraceful decision will be rejected at
the earliest opportunity. The decision of the Court of Appeal on the question
of bail is no less deplorable. By presuming the applicants guilty and using that
as a ground to refuse them bail, the Court of Appeal itself committed a breach
of the applicants' right to the presumption of innocence and joined with the
executive in the appalling practice of using pre-trial detention as punishment.
This is also a shameful decision which should be disowned by the Supreme
Court and other courts not bound by it whenever the opportunity presents
itself.
The manifest partiality of the Court of Appeal in both decisions is a strong
hint of the lack of judicial independence in Cameroon. This is a long-standing
problem. It has been said that “forty years after [national] independence, the
judiciary [in Cameroon] still has to ®ght to gain its own independence.''29
The two decisions of the Court of Appeal under discussion appear to indicate
that some senior members of the judiciary have given up the ®ght for judicial
independence, preferring instead to collude with the executive in human
rights violations. Lord Denning once classi®ed judges into ``bold spirits'',
27 See e.g. E/CN.4/2000/9/Add.2, Report of the UN Special Rapporteur, submitted pursuant
to UN Commission on Human Rights resolution 1998/38, paras. 52 and 53.
28 Ibid.
29 Innocent Bonu, Esq, “Neglect of the Judiciary'' (2002) 1 Cameroon Common Law Journal 5,
para. 4.