from the world of senses. Moreover, the probability of an error increases proportionately
with the distance from the level of subordination (here, ‘material-simple nature’) to the
level of super-ordination (that is ‘intellectual-simple nature’) - more away from the sense
data, more vulnerable to error.3 Since the basic intention of Descartes was “to establish
anything at all in the sciences that was stable and likely to last”, how could it be possible
to give an emphasis on the ‘intellectual-simple nature’, which requires some degree of
rationality (nos rationis esse participes)? There is no point here to disagree with the view
that rationality, as a higher level state, is much more vulnerable to error. Therefore,
‘material-simple nature’ constitutes the domain for the epistemological enterprise, while
the ‘intellectual-simple nature’ belongs to the domain of metaphysics.
But why should one talk about all these things? Later, in our discussion we will
show how this basic design of Cartesian thesis reigned over the following semantic
tradition, no matter whether it belongs to philosophical logic or to linguistic or to any
other scientific discourse. In addition to our previous argument, we would just like to
argue here that epistemological enquiries are turned as the study of res extensa, whereas
metaphysical enquiries are in the domain of res cogitans. But to achieve a self-evident /
self-consistent form of knowledge, we need dissolution of this distinction.
In our concluding section (5), we will take a brief account of the possible
philosophical solutions to this issue of distinction. Now, in the next section our major
concern will be to address the issue of erasing the boundary between the above
mentioned epistemological concern and metaphysical concern, in terms of shift,
particularly in the field of semantics.
2. Genesis of Semantics: Intrusion of common sense metaphysics
Genesis of semantics presupposes this developmental path. Semantics as a branch of
philosophical logic is mainly concerned about res extensa. To what extent does our
thought synchronize the knowledge of the extension? More explicitly, reasoning, being
independent of human imagination, links the things, signified by the names, as if it is an
part of the external world, and being shaped by the world. Reasoning emerges because
there are enough causal determinants in the external world. Hence, extensional (Wilson
2003). Here the basic concern is to measure the justification of reasoning, with the help
of the truth scale. The most primitive as well as basic definition of the truth has been
originally proposed by Aristotle, which states that “to say of what is that it is not, or of
what is not that it is, is false; while to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is
not, is true” (Haack 1978). On the other hand, semantics, as a linguistics enquiry, is
mainly concerned about the knowledge representation. Being an exploration in the field
of res cogitans, it aims to construct a picture of a language, as a self-contained coherent
system, whose constituents are in causal interaction. Under the banner of philosophical
logic, its aim is to prescribe a standard form of reasoning or a theory of order (Feibleman
1979), which is in accordance with the scientific investigation; while as a branch of
linguistics, it deals with the concept-internal structure mainly, to provide us with a model,
explaining how a linguistic phenomenon comes into existence. Finally, a central concern
of logic is to discriminate valid argument from invalid one, irrespective of its subject
matter. That is why logic is ‘topic-neutral’ - it is concerned with the form of the