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The next step in the study of human representations is even more demanding.
What are the neural mechanisms of RH (i.e., the ability to create neural
representations)? The added difficulty may easily be seen when one realizes that RH
may well involve unconscious processes while at the same time its end results lack
the specificity and concreteness of external representations or KR schemes (end
results of extRH). Still, assuming the continuity of the Homo genus (and therefore of
some relation between neural and external representations) and, furthermore, taking
into account the notion of perceptual image, we find it reasonable to adopt the
following working:
Definition-16: For a human H, a neural representation of a situation K is an Nm
structure such that:
a) It is a simplification of K; and
b) It tends to preserve the essential characteristics of K.
This is both in agreement with neurobiological requirements of internal
representations (e.g., Blakemore et al. 2002, Moser et al. 2008) and avoids Ramsey’s
(2003) criticisms of receptor representation. It is also straightforwardly generalisable
to hold for a good number of animal species in full agreement with Bickerton’s
(1990) argument that a primary representational system, developed in various forms,
exists in all higher animals and Hurford’s (2003) argument of powerful neural
representational systems. Finally, it is compatible with the classical ethological
finding of relative uniqueness of nearly every species through their species-specific
representational capabilities. Similarly to extRH, specification of the mechanisms of RH
(in contrast to mere identification of its end result) is a significant open question in
the study of mind. As with extRH, it appears that RH may well be related to
understanding. In contrast to extRH, such understanding, if indeed related, may, more
often than not, be unconscious and hence hardly accessible with the current state of
technology. Whether they do, and if yes, exactly how they are related is a second
important question.
It is worth noting that neuroimaging experiments, incorporating the notions of
scope and grain size of a representation, may just be possible to indicate potential
neural structures that preserve certain characteristics of K. Kurto & Itskov’s (2008)
work on group cells and their relationship to the Kantian concept of space may be
seen as an example of such work. It should be stressed though that the issue of neural
representations, even in the special case of spatial representation with its nearly forty
years history (e.g., O’Keefe & Dostrovsky 1971), has far too many open questions
(e.g., Moser et al 2008) for definitive conclusions on its nature to be drawn.
In conclusion, additionally to characteristics derived from their common root in
neural thinking (cf. section 2.1), mental and external representations share the crucial
feature of ‘preserving the essential characteristics of K.43 The key difference between
the two kinds of representations is the potential permanence of external
representations. This is partly responsible for the uniqueness of human mind. The
next section identifies its complementary part.