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concomitantly decreasing the pressures (and opportunities) for congressmen's
personalization.
However, the same political and institutional constraints might create exactly
opposite pressures. Given that just one in four (26%) deputies obtains a place on the
ballot after four years in office, and only one in five (20%) is reelected; current
representatives need to act prospectively if they want to secure their political futures.
Even though their current position is Iikely to be the product of the leaders' conformity,
legislators will not obtain desirable political positions in the future without developing a
reputation appropriate to their career goals. It might be somehow Xmrealistic to think
that current legislators would simply rely on their party superiors' benevolence.
Governors and party leaders are not altruistic actors; rather, they also make calculations
when allocating positions such as a place in party lists for different positions. Loyalty is
a valid capital to be considered for a further position; however, politics usually involves
more than mere consideration as "a nice guy". Politicians are more likely to be
considered for future positions if they can show a political capital that makes them a
relevant political actor. Political capital can be constructed in many ways: money, votes,
reputation, recognition, or responsiveness, among others. So, if legislators care about
their future, shouldn't they try to build credible political capital?
Considering that almost every elected office (and an overwhelming majority of
appointed positions) is chosen within the provinces, legislators have clear incentives to
create a reputation and support bases among certain groups of constituents. That capital
might not only benefit a politician's electoral performance in the future, but would also
signal party comrades. The question that becomes salient here is what (and how many)
resources can a legislator count with to broaden her capital during her tenure. The