248 Public Lectures
it to give rise to sensations within it. Another distinguishing
trait of mind is the elastic continuity1 and insolidity of its
elements. Matter is divisible into solid, discontinuous parts.
Mind is not. Both substances are to us alike in that the inner
essence or ultimate constitution of each is unknowable. . . .
Finally we are in a position to narrow down our analysis
to sense-perception, which is the transaction of the mind with
physical existence by means of the sense-organs. In order to
keep the situation clearly before us, let us return to the hu-
man body we built up out of atoms and which lies here inani-
mate before us. This is not at all Locke’s method of expo-
sition, but I think he could not complain that it misrepre-
sents the essentials of his view, and it obviously simplifies
the task of describing how the mind gets its store of “ideas.”
Now to animate our hand-made organism, we say presto I
and behold in its open eyes not only the hard glitter of me-
chanically reflected light, but also the softer light of—shall
we say—something that looks out upon you and sees you.
Physically speaking, no change has occurred in the object be-
fore us, save perhaps a quickened motion of minute parts. In
another sense, though, something additional now pervades
the organism, capacitating it for experience of its own,
whereas previously not even the shock of the most powerful
stimulus could have aroused it to become aware of the exist-
ence of things. This awareness is a property of mind, as
motion is of matter.
However, though in a sense this mind is in the body, there
is as yet nothing in the mind, for we have just now, by hy-
pothesis, joined it to the body. It has not yet any experience,
hence it is a tabula rasa, a blank sheet, a dark room into
ɪ This does not deny Locke’s “composition” theory of mind, but indicates
rather the “faculties” of the mind, whose “innateness” he asserted, as for
example in his note on the margin of Burnet’s Remarks on the Essay.