The Congress of Vienna 57
reactionary idea which it became in the hands of the relent-
less Metternich. It meant simply that mere conquest should
not be allowed to give title in a well-ordered world. Changes
in the shape and size of states should be based upon broad
historic considerations. Although it was actually invoked to
safeguard the property rights of certain kings in their gov-
ernments, it is essentially capable of being used to-day in a
modified form which is, after all, not so very different from
Talleyrand’s first version. Its spirit would say to an assem-
bled world to-day, not what Metternich made it say in the
two decades after the Congress of Vienna, “Kings shall
never be dethroned,” but rather this : “Power alone shall not
settle the question of Belgium. National rights, popular
aspiration, legitimate economic hopes must determine the
ownership of Macedonia, of Trieste and the Dalmatian
coast.” And interpreted thus in the interests of people, and
not of kings and governments, it is yet a principle to which
every thoughtful liberal might well subscribe.
At Vienna this idea of legitimacy, which might have been
broadened and made genuinely fruitful, was used in a few
cases and was then discarded in the interest of what seemed
the more immediate requirements of the hour. To France,
far more than to the Bourbons, it rendered an inestimable
service, for it really performed a miracle. Her historic
bounds were restored to her practically intact, and even
after the return of Napoleon and the disaster at Waterloo
she lost only Savoy, which was to be restored to her later
under the influence of Cavour, and some comparatively un-
important frontier fortresses. The real criticism of the
diplomats of Vienna is not that they clung too closely to the
idea of legitimacy in their territorial settlements, but rather
that they interpreted it too narrowly and that they departed
from it too often either in the spirit of cowardice or of utter