Ends and Means in Religious Education 41
on the grounds that they destroy not only religious meaning
but tire possibility of philosophical inquiry as well. He be-
lieves that reason must remain open and growing, acknowl-
edging new insights in a realistic appraisal of events and
persons. A more comprehensive judgment of the intellectual
life will acknowledge the contribution of the mystic, prophet
and religious genius in tire apprehension of meaning.
Reinhold Niebuhr in his Faith and Histonj emphasizes
that progress in physical science has a different character
than growth in religion. Whereas scientific knowledge is
cumulative and allows of continuous growth and develop-
ment in time, man’s inner life is more complex by its very
nature. At the philosophical level, growth in maturity and
wisdom must be distinguished from the external accumula-
tion of factual knowledge. No single idea or world view can
be accepted as valid simply because it is later in time se-
quence. Radical retrogression as well as new subtleties of
insight appear perennially. Indeed, an oversimplified version
of intellectual progress is likely to repeat old errors. This is
even more the case in religion than in philosophy. Theism has
its ultimate referent in the justice and mercy of God. Sin and
forgiveness require a profoundly searching self-criticism
which cannot be subsumed simply in categories of retrogres-
sion and advance.
Hedley has pointed out that religious education cannot
ignore the “superstitions of the irreligious.”21 Niebuhr’s cri-
tique is particularly telling against the persistent belief that
science will sooner or later resolve all philosophical and theo-
logical problems. He has shown conclusively that it is beyond
the scope of the physical or social sciences to replace all
evaluative judgments with “objective data.” In fact, the
doctrine that “reason” must ultimately displace “faith” is it-