34 The Rice Institute Pamphlet
does not lend itself to artistic elaboration, and is not an
æsthetie content. Feeling, or the state of the soul, is not a par-
ticular content, but the whole universe seen sub specie in-
tuitionis; and outside it there is no other content conceivable
that is not also a different form of the intuitive form; not
thoughts, which are the whole universe sub specie cogita-
tionis; not physical things and mathematical beings, which
are the whole universe sub specie Schematismi et abstrac-
tionism not wills, which are the whole universe sub specie vo-
Iitionis.
Another not less fallacious distinction (to which the words
“content” and “form” are also applied) separates intuition
from expression, the image from the physical translation of
the image. It places on one side phantasms of feeling, im-
ages of men, of animals, of landscapes, of actions, of adven-
tures, and so on; and on the other, sounds, tones, lines, col-
ours, and so on; calling the first the external, the second the
internal element of art: the art properly so-called, the other
technique. It is easy to distinguish internal and external, at
least in words, especially when no minute enquiry is made
as to the reasons and motives for the distinction, and when
the distinction is just thrown down there without any service
being demanded of it; so easy that by never thinking about
it the distinction may eventually come to seem to thought
indubitable. But it becomes a different question when, as
must be done with every distinction, we pass from the act of
distinguishing to that of establishing relation and unifying,
because this time we run against desperate obstacles. What
has here been distinguished cannot be unified, because it has
been badly distinguished: how can something external and
extraneous to the internal become united to the internal and
express it? How can a sound or a colour express an image