The name is absent

The Breviary of Aesthetic 5?
portrait or copy or imitation of nature, or history of the indi-
vidual and of the times, etc.), and, worse still, of the percep-
tion a kind of image apprehensible by the “senses.” But per-
ception is neither more nor less than a complete judgment,
and as judgment implies an image and a category or system
of mental categories which must dominate the image (re-
ality, quality, etc.); and in respect of the image, or a prion
æsthetie synthesis of feeling and fancy (intuition), it is a new
synthesis, of representation and category, of subject and
predicate, the a priori logical synthesis, of which it would be
fitting to repeat all that has been said of the other, and, above
all, that in it content and form, representation and category,
subject and predicate, do not appear as two elements united
by a third, but the representation appears as category, the
category as representation, in indivisible unity: the subject is
subject only in the predicate, and the predicate is predicate
only in the subject. Nor is perception a logical act among
other logical acts, or the most rudimentary and imperfect of
them; for he who is able to extract from it all the treasures it
contains would have no need to seek beyond it for other de-
terminations of Iogicity, because consciousness of what has
really happened, which in its eminently literary forms takes
the name of history, and consciousness of the universal,
which in its eminent forms takes the name of system or phi-
losophy, spring from perception, which is itself this synthetic
gemination: and philosophy and history constitute the supe-
rior unity, which philosophers have discovered, for no other
reason than the synthetic connection of the perceptive judg-
ment, whence they are born and in which they live, identify-
ing philosophy and history, and which men of good sense
discover in their own way, though they always observe that
ideas suspended in air are phantoms, are facts which occur

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