What Lessons for Economic Development Can We Draw from the Champagne Fairs?



powers immediately; others developed them only gradually or not at all. Those
consular jurisdictions that did exist at the fairs could only be used to resolve conflicts
within a particular community, not between members and outsiders. Even then, having
a consul at the fairs did not exempt merchants from the jurisdiction of the count of
Champagne or, after 1285, the king of France. Most importantly, the majority of
merchants - including key groups such as the Flemish - never had their own
community jurisdictions at the Champagne fairs.

What about the second argument, that contract enforcement at the Champagne fairs
was supported by community-based collective reprisals? It is true that after 1260 the
princely fair-wardens used a procedure against defaulting debtors that could culminate
in collective reprisals. If a debt incurred at a fair was not repaid at the agreed time, the
debtor was prosecuted in one of the various public courts available at the fairs
provided he was still in Champagne. If he had left Champagne, his creditor could ask
the princely fair-wardens to write to the authorities in the town where he was currently
located, asking them to compel payment by either seizing his goods or sending him
back to appear before the wardens. If the foreign authorities did not comply, the fair-
wardens could be asked to send further letters reiterating the request. After at least
three letters, the fair-wardens could threaten the foreign authorities with a fair-ban
excluding its merchants from future fairs and declaring their goods and bodies forfeit
to repay the debt. Even at this stage, the foreign authorities could delay the ban by
appearing before the fair-wardens and explaining why they could not enforce
repayment. The foreign authorities could also appeal to higher courts - the Jours de
Troyes or the Parlement of Paris - against any fair-ban.146

But these collective reprisals were not community-based. They were part of the
formal, public legal system. Merchant communities at the Champagne fairs played no
role in requesting or imposing fair-bans. Most merchants were not even subject to
community pressure at the fairs, since as already discussed consular jurisdictions at the
fairs arose only after 1245, and even then only for a few groups of merchants. Even in
merchants’ home cities, the town government rather than the merchant guild was seen
as the relevant authority for enforcing contracts: in 1294, for example, when the

146 Laurent (1935), 283-96; Bautier (1953), 123-6.

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