Volunteering and the Strategic Value of Ignorance



an incentive for the rival to remain uninformed of his own cost. For intermediate
values of
T, a mixed strategy equilibrium exists that exhibits similar properties to
the one characterized in Lemma 3b(ii). The value of information is then determined
by the shape of the probability distribution of the provision cost. The resulting
effects are qualitatively the same, but can be most clearly demonstrated by using a
two-point distribution and varying the probabilities that the cost of provision is high
and low, respectively. The key assumption remains that with positive probability
individuals face a rival who prefers to wait until the time limit is reached. In this
sense, our approach is similar to Fudenberg and Tirole (1986), who assume that there
is a positive probability that the rival never concedes. For the incentives to find out
about the cost of provision, the time limit is of additional strategic importance.

A Appendix

A.l Proof of Lemma 1

Denote by Φj∙ the distribution of j’s waiting times, from the point of view of i, that
is, Φ
j(t) = a means that, from the point of view of i, j concedes before t with
probability
a.23 Consider a concession of i in ti (ci2 + T1T) and suppose that
there is a strictly positive probability that
i provides the good in ti, i.e. Φj(ti) 1.
If Φj∙ exhibits a discontinuity at C, then there is an
ε > O such that i is strictly better
off by conceding in
t + ε instead of in t, because this would strictly decrease the
expected contribution cost at only an infinitesimally higher expected waiting cost.

23Note that Ψjcaptures both uncertainty of i over j’s contribution cost and possible randomiza-
tion of
j.

26



More intriguing information

1. Running head: CHILDREN'S ATTRIBUTIONS OF BELIEFS
2. Strategic Policy Options to Improve Irrigation Water Allocation Efficiency: Analysis on Egypt and Morocco
3. Self-Help Groups and Income Generation in the Informal Settlements of Nairobi
4. The name is absent
5. Spatial Aggregation and Weather Risk Management
6. The Variable-Rate Decision for Multiple Inputs with Multiple Management Zones
7. Heterogeneity of Investors and Asset Pricing in a Risk-Value World
8. SOCIOECONOMIC TRENDS CHANGING RURAL AMERICA
9. Examining the Regional Aspect of Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries
10. Dual Track Reforms: With and Without Losers
11. The name is absent
12. The purpose of this paper is to report on the 2008 inaugural Equal Opportunities Conference held at the University of East Anglia, Norwich
13. Biological Control of Giant Reed (Arundo donax): Economic Aspects
14. Evolution of cognitive function via redeployment of brain areas
15. Gender and aquaculture: sharing the benefits equitably
16. Fighting windmills? EU industrial interests and global climate negotiations
17. Endogenous Heterogeneity in Strategic Models: Symmetry-breaking via Strategic Substitutes and Nonconcavities
18. APPLYING BIOSOLIDS: ISSUES FOR VIRGINIA AGRICULTURE
19. An Economic Analysis of Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Consumption: Implications for Overweight and Obesity among Higher- and Lower-Income Consumers
20. THE ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION IN HEALTH INSURANCE- THE IRISH CASE STUDY.