The Role of Immigration in Sustaining the Social Security System: A Political Economy Approach



[F(τ 1 ), F(τ 1)]. Under this condition, if kt [F(τ 1 ), F(τ 1)], the indirect utility
of the young voter is maximized by the "demographic steady" strategy and the
aggregate saving decision rule follows:
S(kt , πt = (τ (kt),1), τt+1 = τ (kt+1))
[
F (τ 1), F (τ 1)]. For kt [F (T 1 ), F (τ 1)]c, the value of the young voter’s indirect
utility function is not lower under the "demographic switching" strategy than
under the "demographic steady" strategy (since for
τt [τ 11]c, the solution
would imply setting the constrained). Thus, if
kt [F(τ 1 ),F(τ 1)]c, the in-
direct utility of the young voter is maximized according to the "demographic
switching" strategy:
πt = (0,Min[γ*, mm]) and the aggregate saving decision
rule follows:
S(ktt = (0,Min[γ*, mn])t+1 = ψψ+1 ). It should be noted that
since the optimal solution changes next period decisive voter from young to old,
for all values of
kt+1(defined according to this aggregate saving decision rule:
S(ktt = (0,Min[γ*, mm])t+1 = ψ+1 )), there are no additional conditions
on
kt+1. These conditions are sufficient to assure that the equilibrium conditions
are satisfied when:
m + n > 0 and n < 0.

If the population growth rates satisfy the properties: n, m > 0, there is a
majority of young in every period.

If kt [F1),F(τ 1)], we must prove that the indirect utility of the young
voter is maximized by setting:
Ψ(τ (kt),1) and the aggregate saving decision rule
follows:
S(ktt = (τ (kt),1)t+1 = τ (kt+1)). Otherwise, If kt [F (τ 1),F (τ 1)]c,
we must prove that the indirect utility of the young voter is maximized by set-
ting:
πt = (0,7*) and the aggregate saving decision rule follows: S(ktt =
(0,Y*) t+1 = 0). The young voter’s indirect utility function can be written in
its Lagrangian form as follows:

L = L(kt) with πt+1 = (τ(kt+1),1)   if kt+1[F(τ 1),F(τ 1)]

(73)


L(kt) with πt+1 = (0*)      otherwise
where L(kt) is as defined in equation (43). Note that the immigration quota
is not restricted (
γt = γ*), since the young decisive voter cannot change next
period decisive voter from young to old. According to proposition II, the in-
direct utility of the young subject to constant next period policy variables, is
maximized by setting:
πt = (0, γ*). Thus, similarly to the previous case, we will
require that the value of the young voter’s indirect utility function under the first
decision rule (
πt = (τ (kt),1)), should not be lower than the value of the young
voter’s indirect utility function under the second decision rule
t = Ψ(0*))

33



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