An institutional analysis of sasi laut in Maluku, Indonesia

with the revenues going to the village. This means that some fishers will face access restrictions.
Initially, the village government expects some resistance because “without sasi they can fish
wherever they want.” In the long run, however, the village government does not expect problems
because many villagers feel that “sasi is good for the people” and will thus support it.

The village government realizes that for the continuation of adat institutions and sasi, they
need the active support and input from younger generations. The fact that the sasi regulations
would defend the fishers’ interest through the active exclusion of fishers from surrounding
villages will stimulate support for sasi from young people.

In Tuhaha, successful revitalization is highly dependent on a functional kewang. Most people trust
the government to take decisions for them and they will thus respect sasi regulations as a government
decision. Others, for example, those who view sasi as a restriction, may cause problems. The kewang
is needed to “help the people to respect the sasi regulations”. Based on tradition and the fact that the
kewang members, through a vow, commit themselves to apply the law to anybody who breaks the
rule without favour, the kewang is highly legitimate. Besides, if a sasi regulation is broken, it is the
kewang that is the legitimate actor: “The police cannot do anything because it is traditional.” Therefore,
for the practical enforcement of sasi regulations, a kewang institution is indispensable.

Finally, it is essential for stability that formal and traditional government institutions are
integrated in a defined structure that is acceptable to both parties.

12.8 Outcomes

12.8.1 Equity

1. The role of fishers in management

The participation of fishers in management is seen as having remained the same over time and most
fishers expect either stability or a slight decline in the future. Perceptions on the role of fishers in
management vary greatly. Some say that fishers are more educated and aware, and could and should
thus participate in the management process. Others are happy with the fact that the village head
makes the decisions. They trust the village government to make the right decisions for them.

When asked about power-sharing, 63% thought the government had most or total
responsibility for fisheries management, while 33% thought the people shared responsibility
equally with the government. Only 3% saw the community’s responsibility as being dominant.

2. Access to marine resources

Despite the breakdown of sasi, which turned the sasi area into an open-access regime, the fishers’
personal access to resources is seen to have declined compared to the past, i.e., the 1980s, when
the sasi area was a common property regime. The fishers expect to be more restricted in future.
The re-establishment of sasi in combination with the limited access to fishing grounds and the
auctioned area, plus the increasing numbers of lift nets in the bay, influence this perception. Note,
however, that perceptions were highly variable⁵ . In general, older fishers who own motorboats
(i.e., the small-scale commercial sector) are the ones who perceive access to be most restricted.

⁵ Because of the division of Tuhaha Bay into various fishing zones, i.e., the sasi area, the auctioned area and the
open sea, the question concerning access may have led to confusion which is reflected in the varied answers.

154 An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia

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