An institutional analysis of sasi laut in Maluku, Indonesia

13.6 Incentives to Cooperate

The key to resource management is compliance. Despite the fact that currently compliance to
fisheries regulations is low, there are certain motivations for people to comply with existing,
or newly to be installed regulations for resource management.

Custom

Due to the gradual loss of sasi, some people were actually not aware of the fact that sasi had
been lost. When asked about marine sasi, they explained: “There are regulations on taking marine
products.” Even though there are no sasi signs, no ceremonies, and no kewang, this group of
people will follow the fisheries regulations whether or not they are prescribed by sasi.

Positive opinion on sasi

The women we interviewed generally approved of sasi. The involvement of the church (in
sasi on coconuts) is an improvement compared to the past. Christina Noija Taihutu (wife of
the former village head) explained: “When sasi was still adat, women were excluded from the
ceremonies, but now that sasi is organized by the church everybody can go.” Women’s
involvement in sasi thus stimulates appreciation of sasi and compliance to the rules.

Sanctions

Fear of God and the ancestors’ spirits are important reasons for people to comply with the
rules. The collective prayer (commitment) in the church induces social control mechanisms,
which will be a stimulus for people to follow the rules.

Enforcement

The installation of a local enforcement agent is important for a functioning management
system. In particular, the kewang is an effective institution. Its legitimate position allows the
members to enforce the rules, but only if they act independently from the village government.

Involvement of the formal enforcer, the police, can also be an extra incentive for people to
comply with the rules. If the newly to be installed regulations are approved by the higher
government, the village can ask for police support which will help to stimulate compliance.

Position of the village head

A strong disincentive to comply with the rules is the weak position of the village head. In
contrast to, for example, Nolloth, the village head in Hulaliu has no firm ground to exert his
authority. In the eyes of nearly half the village population, he is not a legitimate leader and
their dissatisfaction is a reason to use illegal fishing methods.

Benefits

The village head has great interest in the commercially interesting commodities that he wants
to place under sasi. The revenues, however, will be used to boost the village treasury. The
villagers strongly oppose fisheries rules if they will not gain direct benefits. The sale of harvest
rights to outsiders is also an important disincentive for fishers to comply with the rules.

170 An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia

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