Table 13.4. Results of the performance analysis in Hulaliu. n=30 heads of fishing households. ns=change
not significant; *=p<0.05, **=p<0.01, ***=p<0.001.
|
Indicator |
Average |
Average change |
Average future | ||
|
Equity | |||||
|
1. Role of fishers in management |
5.93 |
-1.2333ns |
-12% |
-0.8000* |
-8% |
|
2. Access to marine resources |
6.53 |
-1.1667ns |
-12% |
-1.0000*** |
-10% |
|
3. Fair distribution of fishing gears |
7.33 |
2.2667*** |
+23% |
0.6000* |
+6% |
|
4. Income distribution |
6.60 |
0.6000ns |
+6% |
-0.1000ns |
-1% |
|
Efficiency | |||||
|
5. Communal decision-making |
6.17 |
-1.6000** |
-16% |
-0.8667*** |
-9% |
|
6. Ease of entry into the fishery |
6.13 |
-1.9667*** |
-20% |
-1.1667*** |
-12% |
|
7. Control over access to fishery |
6.63 |
-0.0666ns |
-0.7% |
-0.6333* |
-6% |
|
8. Compliance with fishery rules |
5.80 |
-2.2667*** |
-23% |
-1.2333*** |
-12% |
|
Social Sustainability | |||||
|
11. Family well-being |
7.43 |
1.3333* |
+13% |
0,2333ns |
+2% |
|
12. Income |
6.70 |
0.8333ns |
+8% |
0.0666ns |
+0.7% |
|
13. Tradition of collective action |
7.20 |
-1.6667*** |
-17% |
-0.8667*** |
-9% |
|
14. Discussion of village issues |
6.07 |
-2.3333*** |
-23% |
-1.2667*** |
-13% |
|
15. Community harmony |
5.70 |
-1.8667*** |
-19% |
-0.8000* |
-8% |
|
Biological sustainability | |||||
|
14. Marine resource health |
5.60 |
-3.1667*** |
-32% |
-2.0333*** |
-20% |
|
15. Fish catch |
5.50 |
-3.4000*** |
-34% |
-1.5517*** |
-16% |
In the context of political instability, the process of revitalization is precarious. It offers,
however, interesting insights concerning the conditions needed to allow the process to take
place, as well as the right strategy under these circumstances. At the same time, it demonstrates
the extent to which sasi is resilient and able to evolve. In order to avoid obstruction by his
opponents, the village head developed a strategic plan. Higher government levels are involved
as a formal back-up for the process, but the traditional authorities and the church are also
included in the deliberations. Common villagers, on the other hand, were excluded until the
plan was in the final phase to avoid preliminary obstruction or sabotage.
Thus far, it seems that Hulaliu has successfully attempted to get recognition of adat, as well as sasi,
by higher government levels. The sub-district government in Masohi, on the other hand,
acknowledged that sasi is “adat” and as such, should be locally implemented, and enforced by the
kewang. By playing it through the higher government, however, in case of problems, the village
head secured back-up by the police who formally have the authority to interfere in village affairs.
The process of revitalization is merely a “one-man show” run by the village head. Traditionally,
as the kepala adat, he is in the position to re-establish adat institutions by himself. On the other
hand, the lack of transparency may obstruct the process in a later phase. The decline of sasi in
the past was due to mismanagement of the village head who confiscated fine money that
belonged to the kewang. He undermined the authority of the kewang who resigned and
instigated the loss of sasi. Wider back-up and clear defined responsibilities of every involved
institutions are, therefore, crucial. The fact that the new sasi system will generate money for
the village only, without direct benefiting the local fishers directly, is also a point to take into
account. The villagers’ interest is to get access to the fishing grounds and secure protection of
the resources against outside exploitation, including the rented parts of the village marine
territory.
176 An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia