inventory, where sasi is taken over by the church, adat sasi as well as marine sasi may be lost.
However, Haruku and Nolloth provide examples where introduction of church sasi actually
strengthened the local institution. Therefore, in sasi systems that are being revitalized, the
church can play an important supporting role.
In some Muslim villages, sasi has evolved away from adat. Ceremonies and inherited positions
have been abandoned, and religious leaders have also not developed a direct role in the
institution. Sasi has become more of a commercial transaction between the village government
and whoever wins the auction for resource harvesting rights. Nevertheless, this also appears
to be a stable and resilient institution. The benefits and drawbacks of this form of sasi require
further investigation, but our performance analysis did show that this type of arrangement
leads to problems in compliance when local fishers see benefits accruing only to elites.
It was clear that sasi flourishes where the village leader is legitimate (kepala adat) and where
he collaborates harmoniously and honestly with adat leaders and the church. Ostrom (1990)
mentions reciprocity and trust as important conditions for successful common property
institutions. From our study, we would add legitimacy as another key factor for success.
Apparently, the discrepancy between the theory of formal administrative structure and the de
facto power structure that involves traditional authorities, makes village politics susceptible
to manipulation and instability. Amendment of the law on village government (No. 5, 1979)
may be required to accommodate the need for legitimate adat authority figures in rural villages
and increase the stability of the local government.
Because the constitutional rules are part of adat, and “adat is something that cannot be changed”
as village officials in Nolloth stated, the process of revival concerns the re-establishment and
adaptation of operational rules (harvest regulations, access rules) and collective-level
arrangements (re-establishment of the kewang). Adat still forms the basis of sasi, but a
redefinition of responsibilities and involvement of non-adat institutions, i.e., the church, the
police and higher government levels, is possible. Such adaptation of the constitutional rules
carries certain risks and must be advanced with care and tact.
17.8 Conclusions
Berkes and Folke (1998) claim that institutional resilience is a built-in mechanism to react to
external influences. Various social-ecological practices they mention are found in sasi, e.g.,
the temporal restrictions of harvest, inter-generational knowledge, the role of stewards, taboos
and regulations, sanctions, and ceremonies etc. However, our study shows that these are not
the mechanisms, but the components of the institution itself and, as a consequence, apt to
change. What makes the institution, including all these components, strong (and thus resilient)
is that which links these components i.e., legitimacy, trust, collaboration, transparency, etc.
Relations between those who benefit from the institution and those who manage it must be
sincere and transparent. A shared notion of the relevance of the institution stimulates a common
objective to maintain it, in spite of external influences and in a situation where the temptation
to abuse the system for personal benefits is strong.
The extent to which external factors affect the social structure in the village depends on the
feedback mechanisms, i.e., the degree to which the local institution itself can mitigate the
effects of external perturbations. Holling (in Berkes and Folke 1998) speaks in this context of
adaptive management. Sasi has already outlived repeated predictions of imminent demise
(Volker 1925, Cooley 1962) and is clearly both adaptive and resilient. There is, therefore,
Institutional Resilience : Loss and Revival of Sasi 257