to adopt an impartial perspective on questions of intergenerational distribution. In
reality of course, the present generation - seen as one of a series of non-overlapping
generations - enjoys the autonomy to make its own decisions, and the incentive
to behave self-interestedly is strong. From a positive point of view, undiscounted
utilitarianism can be criticised for this reason: there is plenty of evidence to show
that the utility of future generations is discounted at some substantially positive
rate, despite ethical objections. However, our conviction is that the case for DU
depends in large part on the assumption that the future will be better off than the
present for certain, such that if the present generation believed its decisions could
leave the future worse off than it, it could be persuaded to revise those decisions.
Hence we do believe that the criterion of SDU might capture important aspects of
the present generation’s evaluation of climate policies, and other policies where the
sustainability of wellbeing is under threat.
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