same set of data or, alternatively, two (or more) theories related to the problem might be
generated. For each theory, appropriate data would be collected, and it is entirely possible
that different kinds of data might be collected for each theory.
In practice, this might mean that researchers would construct competing explanations on
the basis of the same set of data. These perspectives would result in part from their
engagement in serious reflection about their underlying assumptions, and in part from
submitting their data to the scrutiny of other persons who might have a stake in the
research. It may not be immediately apparent where these theories overlap and where they
conflict, and indeed, these questions may not be meaningful, in that the enquiries might be
incommensurable (Kuhn, 1962). However, by analyzing these enquiries in more detail, it
may be possible to begin a process of theory building that incorporates the different
representations of the situation under study.
This idea of reconciling rival theories is more fully developed in a Hegelian inquiry system,
where antithetical and mutually inconsistent theories are developed. Not content with
building plausible theories, the Hegelian inquirer takes a plausible theory, and then
investigates what would have to be different about the world for the exact opposite of the
most plausible theory itself to be plausible. A crucial question for the Hegelian inquirer is,
“What would have to be different about the world for the exact opposite of my conclusion
to be plausible?” If the answer is, “not very much” then this suggests that the available data
underdetermine to a significant degree the interpretations that are made of them.
The tension produced by confrontation between conflicting theories forces the assumptions
of each theory to be questioned, which might then result in sufficient clarification of the
issues to make possible a co-ordination, or even a synthesis, of the different perspectives, at
a higher level of abstraction. The differences between Lockean, Kantian and Hegelian
inquiry systems were summed up by Churchman as follows:
The Lockean inquirer displays the “fundamental” data that all experts agree are accurate and relevant, and
then builds a consistent story out of these. The Kantian inquirer displays the same story from different
points of view, emphasizing thereby that what is put into the story by the internal mode of representation
is not given from the outside. But the Hegelian inquirer, using the same data, tells two stories, one
supporting the most prominent policy on one side, the other supporting the most promising story on the
other side (Churchman, 1971 p. 177).
It is tempting to view these four inquiry systems as a hierarchy, and in one sense, there
undoubtedly is a logical order relation. The Hegelian inquiry system is a special case of a
Kantian inquiry system, where the multiple representations are constrained to create a
dialectic. The Lockean inquiry system (which clearly subsumes the Leibnizian inquiry
system) is also a special kind of Kantian inquiry where one representation is singled out as
privileged. However, this does not mean that Kantian inquiry systems are always to be
preferred, since this may produce such complexity that progress is impossible—the most
complex representation of a problem is not necessarily the most useful. There is a trade-off
between parsimony and completeness, and therefore there is a choice to be made. In other
words, we can inquire about inquiry systems, questioning the values and ethical
assumptions that these inquiry systems embody.
This inquiry into inquiry systems is itself, of course, an inquiry system, which is termed
Singerian by Churchman after the philosopher E. A. Singer (see Singer, 1957). Such an