economics as being characterized by competing research programmes rather than by one
paradigm.
Hausman engages in a more substantial criticism. He states (1994, p. 199):
“Kuhn’s account of disciplinary matrices provides a checklist of what to look for in
examining the large-scale structures of economic theorizing, but the basic
principles of microeconomics have a different status and role than do Kuhn’s
symbolic generalizations. Consequently, economics does not fit his schema very
well.”
An example of a symbolic generalization in economics is that agents are self-interested.
However, selfish agents are fundamental in much of microeconomics but not in all of it
(Hausman, 1994, p.198). In more general terms, Hausman (1992, p. 84) writes: “The basic
claims of equilibrium theory are not quite symbolic generalizations in Kuhn’s sense, because
economists are not firmly committed to all of them.”
From the above analysis, table 3 presents the main categories of criticism exercised
by historians of economic thought upon Kuhn’s explanation in relation to economics.
Table 3
Criticisms on Kuhn’s explanation | |
Vagueness In terminology |
Non-appropriateness for economics |
Stigler, 1969 |
Bronfenbrener, 1971 |
Blaug, 1976 |
Glass and Johnson, 1989 |
Glass and Johnson, 1989 |
Hausman, 1992, 1994 |
Johnson, 1983 |
Weintraub, 1979 |
Redman, 1993 |
11
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