finally, we will consider whether a transfer fee system can correct the uncompensated
market equilibrium and mimic the social-welfare optimum.
|
Table 1 Number of players i |
n league 1 |
and welfare in both leagues*)____________________ | |||||||||||||
|
α = 0.1 |
α = 0.3 |
α = 0.5 |
α = 0.7 |
α = 0.9 | |||||||||||
|
Ti |
W1 |
W2 |
Ti |
Wi |
W2 |
Ti |
Wi |
W2 |
Ti |
Wi |
W2 |
Ti |
Wi |
W2 | |
|
A: Market demand | |||||||||||||||
|
σ=7 |
1.00 |
469.4 |
195.6 |
1.00 |
483.2 |
195.6 |
0.97 |
488.5 |
209.2 |
0.69 |
488.5 |
204.4 |
0.54 |
488.5 |
209.2 |
|
σ=11 |
1.00 |
474.0 |
195.6 |
1.00 |
496.8 |
195.6 |
1.00 |
511.1 |
195.6 |
0.83 |
512.8 |
203.4 |
0.65 |
512.8 |
214.5 |
|
σ=15 |
1.00 |
477.1 |
195.6 |
1.00 |
506.1 |
195.6 |
1.00 |
526.6 |
195.6 |
0.90 |
531.7 |
201.4 |
0.70 |
531.7 |
216.4 |
|
σ=7 |
1.00 |
469.4 |
23.0 |
1.00 |
B: Optimal location with N1 /N 483.2 23.0 0.92 488.5 23.4 0.66 |
2 =10 488.5 24.9 |
0.53 |
488.5 |
25.8 | ||||||
|
σ=11 |
1.00 |
474.0 |
23.0 |
1.00 |
496.8 |
23.0 |
1.00 |
511.1 |
23.0 |
0.80 |
512.7 |
24.9 |
0.63 |
512.8 |
27.0 |
|
σ=15 |
1.00 |
477.1 |
23.0 |
1.00 |
506.1 |
23.0 |
1.00 |
526.6 |
23.0 |
0.87 |
531.6 |
24.6 |
0.68 |
531.6 |
27.4 |
|
σ=7 |
1.00 |
469.4 |
60.0 |
1.00 |
C: Optimal location with N1 /N2 = 5 483.2 60.0 0.87 488.1 61.1 0.64 488.3 |
63.9 |
0.53 |
488.5 |
65.4 | ||||||
|
σ=11 |
1.00 |
474.0 |
60.0 |
1.00 |
496.8 |
60.0 |
1.00 |
511.1 |
60.0 |
0.77 |
512.3 |
64.2 |
0.61 |
512.6 |
68.1 |
|
σ=15 |
1.00 |
477.1 |
60.0 |
1.00 |
506.1 |
60.0 |
1.00 |
526.6 |
59.9 |
0.83 |
530.9 |
63.8 |
0.66 |
531.2 |
69.2 |
|
σ=7 |
1.00 |
469.4 |
195.6 |
1.00 |
D: Optimal location with N1 /N2 = 2 483.2 195.6 0.71 485.8 201.8 0.58 487.5 |
206.8 |
0.51 |
488.4 |
209.4 | ||||||
|
σ=11 |
1.00 |
474.0 |
195.6 |
1.00 |
496.8 |
195.6 |
0.85 |
507.1 |
200.7 |
0.66 |
509.3 |
210.6 |
0.56 |
511.3 |
217.8 |
|
σ=15 |
1.00 |
477.1 |
195.6 |
1.00 |
506.1 |
195.6 |
0.93 |
524.0 |
198.5 |
0.71 |
526.3 |
211.8 |
0.59 |
528.7 |
222.4 |
|
T1 |
E: Optimal location and lump-sum redistribution with N1 /N2 |
2**) SWNT |
SWLT | ||||||||||||
|
σ=7 |
1.00 |
663.5 |
665.2 |
1.00 |
678.8 |
679.7 |
0.75 |
687.6 |
687.9 |
0.58 |
694.3 |
694.3 |
0.51 |
697.8 |
697.8 |
|
σ=11 |
1.00 |
669.6 |
669.9 |
1.00 |
692.4 |
694.5 |
0.88 |
707.8 |
710.7 |
0.70 |
719.9 |
720.6 |
0.54 |
728.1 |
729.2 |
|
σ=15 |
1.00 |
672.7 |
673.1 |
1.00 |
701.7 |
705.0 |
1.00 |
722.5 |
728.9 |
0.72 |
737.1 |
740.5 |
0.58 |
750.1 |
751.6 |
|
*)The total number of players T is |
assumed to be equal to one; the big league has market size N1 = |
100. | |||||||||||||
The entries indicate the number of players in league 1, T1, generated by the market (Panel A); or
representing the optimal number of players in league 1 calculated from eq. (2), (Panels B-D), and the
welfare for the leagues, W1 and W2, defined by Wi = Ni logΠi,i = 1,2. For the market case, N2 = 50 is
assumed. **)Panel E displays the number of players and the total welfare without (SWNT) and with (SWLT)
lump-sum redistributions, respectively
3.1 The market without transfer fees
The most interesting case to consider is where in the big league at least the number of
talents available in the own country is less than the maximum number of players that can
More intriguing information
1. The name is absent2. Computational Batik Motif Generation Innovation of Traditi onal Heritage by Fracta l Computation
3. Parallel and overlapping Human Immunodeficiency Virus, Hepatitis B and C virus Infections among pregnant women in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, Nigeria
4. HOW WILL PRODUCTION, MARKETING, AND CONSUMPTION BE COORDINATED? FROM A FARM ORGANIZATION VIEWPOINT
5. Neighborhood Effects, Public Housing and Unemployment in France
6. Recognizability of Individual Creative Style Within and Across Domains: Preliminary Studies
7. Detecting Multiple Breaks in Financial Market Volatility Dynamics
8. The name is absent
9. Geography, Health, and Demo-Economic Development
10. How Offshoring Can Affect the Industries’ Skill Composition