Table 1: The impact of corporate taxation on foreign affiliate production®
small |
Affiliate production in large |
country j if country i is: | ||||||||||
identical |
skilled labor | |||||||||||
EX |
C |
DED |
EX |
C |
DED |
EX |
C |
DED |
EX |
C |
DED | |
Affiliate production |
1.65% |
1.65% |
O6 |
14.89% |
14.89% |
8.07% |
25.00% |
25.00% |
25.00% |
45.26% |
45.26% |
45.94% |
∆ti |
+ |
+/-c |
0 (-) |
+ |
+/-c |
- |
+ |
+/-e |
- |
+ |
+ |
+ |
∆t7 |
- |
-/+d |
0 (-) |
- |
-/+d |
- |
- |
-/ + ʃ |
+a |
- |
- |
- |
ʌp |
- |
- |
0 (-) |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
∆<5i |
+ |
+ |
0 (+) |
+ |
+ |
+ |
+ |
+ |
+ |
- |
- |
- |
δ¾' |
- |
- |
0 (-) |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
+ |
+ |
+ |
Notes: The assumptions about factor endowments in country i are as following: small: Li/(L¾ H- L7-) = Si∕(Si + Sj) = 0.15. large: Li∕(Li ⅛ Lj) = Si∕(Si ⅛ <S7-) = 0.85.
identical: Li/(Li + L7) = Si/(Si + Sj) = 0.5. skilled labor abundant: Li/(Li + L7) = 0.15, Si∕(Si + Sj) = 0.85.
∆t¾ (A,tj) indicates an increase of the corporate tax rate in country i (country j).
Λ,tJ' indicates an increase of the withholding tax in country j.
Δ<5⅛ (Δ<57) indicates an increase in the depreciation allowances in country i (country j).
a Affiliate production is measured in percent of the total production of the X-good.
b To evaluate the impact of a change in tax parameter, the tax rates are set at L = tj = 0.05, which leads to affiliate production of 7.86% initially.
c Positive, if country i is in excess credit position, i.e. if L < (tj -∖-1↑∕ (1 — tj)) holds, otherwise negative.
d Negative, if country i is not in excess credit position, i.e. if tj < (t¾ — tj (1 — tj)) holds, otherwise positive.
e Positive, if both countries are in excess credit position, i.e. within the range (tj — fP(l — ti)) < ti < (tj T tP(l — tj)), otherwise negative.
ʃ Negative, if both countries are in excess credit position, i.e. within the range (ti — tj (1 — t7)) < t7- < (ti H- tj (1 — tj), otherwise positive.
9 Positive, for a reasonably large tax increase, otherwise negative.