24
promise is possible, the status quo is preserved, thus increasing the risk of a reduction of the
system’s problem-solving capacity’ (Saalfeld 2003: 371).
Various features of the German political system are relevant in this respect, and I will
briefly discuss them in turn. The country’s multiple veto points include a bicameral parlia-
ment, a federal state structure, a strong judiciary and judicial review of policies by the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court, and corporatist procedures for interest mediation.21 In essence, the
existence of veto points may allow government decisions to be blocked by other political
actors (Immergut 1992; Bonoli 2001).22 In turn, the existence of (institutionally defined)
veto points allow formal veto players23 to wield some influence on policy outcomes
(Tsebelis 1995; Tsebelis 1999). However, whether this will happen ultimately depends on
certain conditions, for instance, whether formal veto players actually make use of the veto
points’ blocking opportunities: therefore, it is premature to conclude that veto players will
always hinder decisions - as the literature often does - but to also take the conditions into
account. Moreover, interest groups may try to form alliances with formal veto players or try
to influence their policy preferences during a political reform process: if the former are suc-
cessful, they may be considered ‘informal’ veto players (Bonoli 2000; Swank 2001) and
increase the likelihood of influencing policy outcomes, either in the sense of blocking or
expediting them.
Following on from this, the co-existence of two systems of regulation with different and
potentially conflicting logics of action has increasingly produced blockades in policy-
making. Scharpf has coined the term ‘joint-decision trap’, describing the combination of
multiple veto points and a bicameral parliament that may feature different party majorities
in the two chambers of Bundestag and Bundesrat (Scharpf 1988); this condition has also
been referred to as ‘incongruent bicameralism’ (Lijphart 1984). Seen from another angle,
the problem stems from potentially conflicting systems of regulation in a federal state; i.e.
the two arenas of political party competition and negotiation between different state levels
(Lehmbruch 2000).24 These conflicting logics manifest themselves in particular when there
21 See for a discussion of these features in interaction with party competition in the context of pension
policy (Schulze and Jochem (forthcoming, 2007)
22 The argument goes that the ability of government to achieve a desired policy outcome depends on the
presence or absence of veto points to a large extent (Immergut 1992; Bonoli 2001). A further distinction
can be made between formal and informal veto points; the former exist because of constitutional provi-
sions, the latter allow access of interest groups to the formal decision-making processes.
23 Tsebelis (1995) defines ‘veto players’ as ‘individual or collective actors who agreement is necessary
for changing the status quo’. Further, he distinguishes institutional veto players (in presidental systems)
and partisan veto players (in parliamentary systems). Moreover, he argues that the policy change be-
comes less likely the more veto players exist, the larger the difference between their policy positions and
the less cohesive these positions are.
24 In a situation of differing majorities, the opposition acquires a quasi-governing role in the Bundesrat
and tends to block legislation for electoral-strategic reasons, not the least because the largest parties tend
to compete on social policy issues. Because of the frequency of elections (on the Lander and federal
level), electoral competition tends to be more or less present all of the time which works against reforms
or at least creates a permanent electoral risk for a reform-eager government. As a result, opposition par-
ties tend to do well in Lander elections, strengthening their (majority) position even further.