proved politically and economically unsustainable, particularly for food crops. Fiscal crises and
increased donor leverage over domestic policy put agricultural reform on the structural
adjustment agenda in the 1980s. After first trying to strengthen the performance of state
marketing boards in the 1960s and 1970s, donors and international lenders lost patience with
phased and partial reform programs that were increasingly seen as propping up costly and
otherwise unsustainable pricing and marketing policies rather than facilitating reform (Jones
1994). In addition, political economy models (e.g., Bates 1981) suggested that state interventions
in agricultural markets, while ostensibly designed for rural development or to correct for market
failures, were often designed to serve the interests of a dominant elite composed of bureaucrats,
urban consumers, the military, and industry. The framework of lending contingent upon
acceptance of policies proposed by lending agencies has strongly influenced the path of market
reform and has expanded external leverage over domestic agricultural policy through aid
conditionality. More than any other factor, agricultural policy reform in Africa has generally been
undertaken as a response to fiscal crises and has rarely been initiated with strong domestic
political support.
In part, the lack of initial enthusiasm for policy reform by African leaders probably reflected
doubts about how responsive the economy would be to these reforms. In many countries, the
poor state of roads, irrigation, and other physical infrastructure combined with the lack of
varieties highly responsive to intensified input use have, in the past, limited supply response to
higher prices resulting from reforms, thereby dampening policymakers’ enthusiasm for further
reforms. (Binswanger 1990; Cleaver 1985; Barrett and Carter 1997; Staatz and Ba 1996).
Given the policy context, it is not surprising that in many cases the sectoral reforms as prescribed
by lenders and outside advisors have been only partially implemented and have been subjected to
frequent policy reversals. In much of Eastern and Southern Africa, the state marketing boards
continue to operate and remain major players in the market. In other cases, selected functions of
the abolished marketing boards are again being carried out by reconstituted public agencies, albeit
on a reduced scale, and agricultural price controls are still enforced in some countries. The partial
implementation of the reforms underscores the need for caution in assessing the effects of sectoral
reform. It should also be noted that many marketing boards and price policies were adopted in
response to real problems with existing systems, often related to food and income insecurity.
Many of these problems remain, as do political demands for solutions to them.
2.2 Broad Trends in Agricultural Productivity Growth
Figures 1 through 7 present the trends in crop land and labor productivity for Burkina Faso,
Senegal, Mali, Ethiopia, Kenya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Land productivity is defined as the
inflation-adjusted value of crop output per hectare; labor productivity is defined as the inflation-