however seem not likely to occur, according to Profeta’s findings. Is it always the case? It is
not lacking a vein of literature which stresses that interest groups’ pressure may decrease dur-
ing emergency times (e.g. Drazen and Grilli 1993).23 Secondly, the “old” “Public choice” fre-
quently argued that radical reforms, which deeply redistribute property rights, can go further
than piecemeal and uncompensated cutting of single rents (e.g. Buchanan 1980).
Anyway the political process on taxation should be not just legitimated but also perfectly
transparent. I stress this apparent obvious point (the real and not just only formal implementa-
tion of the principle “no taxation without representation”) because we saw that some recent
European tax reforms were not exactly transparent. Avoiding fiscal illusion is truly important
to allow citizens to properly evaluate the fairness of fiscal exchange, being rational and well
informed (further simplification of tax system may help), and also, if possible, somewhat al-
truistic.
(ii) Taxing rules and social behavior - The structure of tax rules has wide effects on social
behavior, not just on tax compliance. The latter should obviously be empowered in order to
make taxation reliable and sure, amnesties should be avoided, evasion and corruption should
be heavily fought against, tax administration should be efficient and correct with tax-payers.
Once more I recall obvious textbook features just because they in fact are largely absent in
European Countries, especially the Mediterranean ones’ (Bovi 2002). The social effects of
taxing rules are however deeper and far reaching. These rules intervene in the most sensible
relationship between the state and the citizens. Being well behaved and observed, they induce
an higher degree of Kantian public ethics which in turn stimulates better educated behaviors,
more social cohesion, more sound and altruistic preferences. All this is also welfare and it
might to trigger a virtuous chain reaction with the growth rates.
(iii) Tax equity - Vertical equity (par. 3.2, over) was not strengthened but if anything
weakened by recent European tax reforms. Tax progressivity has been largely contrasted by
alleging both efficiency and ideological arguments. This theoretical and political stance is
pretty questionable and seems not to compare favorably with the following three arguments.
Taken together, these arguments should favor the empowering and not the dismantling the
degree of vertical equity, i.e. of the redistributive purposes of tax system.
23 One may however doubt if is this really the present state of affairs that (rational and well informed?) European
citizens at present do perceive.
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