Making International Human Rights Protection More Effective: A Rational-Choice Approach to the Effectiveness of Ius Standi Provisions



The bright side of the system can be found in the broad access to the African Commission. The
vaguely formulated Art. 55 of the African Charter, which also provides for individual com-
plaints, was more clearly outlined in Chapter XVII of the Rules of Procedure of the African
Commission, but still leaves huge interpretative leeway to the African Commission. There is no
requisite for a victim requirement, so the African Commissions’ decisions are decisive to deter-
mine the ius standi under the African Charter. The African Commission allows individual and
group complaints, but also altruistic NGO communications, either on behalf of named victims or
NGO complaints alleging human rights violations without specifying victims’ names.214 The
African Commission thus dispensed with the requirement of naming the individual victims,
thereby allowing for a communication of NGOs alleging human rights violations without speci-
fying victims.215 The African Commission held that Art. 56(1) of the Banjul Charter requires
only that communications indicate their authors, not the names of all the victims, as the more
massive the violation, the greater the likelihood that the victims will be numerous. This permits
communications to be brought by a few individuals on behalf of many. It is - in the African
Commission’s view - also a rational response to the great difficulties that victims themselves
may encounter in bringing communications, in just such circumstances of economic hardship
and political repression as were alleged in the Communication at hand.216 Most of the communi-
cations received by the African Commission have been submitted by NGOs, both African and
foreign on behalf of (a group of) individuals. Thus in practice, the African Commission receives
communications from any person or organization.217

Therefore it seems safe to say that the African Commission allows in principle for actio popu-
laris,218 but one needs to bear in mind that, because of the requirement for NGOs to be registered
with the AU in order to have standing, the actio popularis in its “classical” sense is restricted and
a filter is provided.219 A true actio popularis would allow virtually everybody to file a communi-
cation. In practice though, the African Commission understands this broad standing requirements
as an actio popularis, which it described in the famous Ogoni case as useful and as ”wisely al-
lowed under the African Charter.”220

214 See Communications 25/89, 47/90, 56/91 and 100/93 (World Organisation Against Torture et al./Zaire) and
Communication 155/96 (Social and Economic Rights Action Center/Center for Economic and Social Rights
v. Nigeria), where the commission held, at para. 42, that where the author of a communication is a non-
governmental organization, and the situation is one of serious or massive violations, it may be simply
impossible for the author to collect the name of each individual victim.

215 Ibid. at para. 42 and Communications 25/89, 47/90, 56/91 and 100/93 World Organisation Against Torture et
al. v. Zaire, where it held that if the situation is one of serious or massive violations, it may be simply
impossible for the author to collect the name of each individual victim.

216 Communication 155/96 (Social and Economic Rights Action Center/Center for Economic and Social Rights
v. Nigeria), at para. 40 et seq.

217 Essien, supra note 138, at 106.

218 Bernard H. Oxman/Dinah Shelton, “Decision regarding Communication 155/96 (Social and Economic Rights
Action Center/Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria)”, American Journal of International Law
96 (2002), 937-942, at 937.

219 Some 300 NGOs, including international and non-African NGOs, had been granted observer status with the
African Commission. See Directory of NGOs with Observer Status (listing dates on which observer status
granted),
http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/directory_ngo_en.html (last visited May 16, 2005).

220 Communication 155/96 (Social and Economic Rights Action Center/Center for Economic and Social Rights
v. Nigeria), at para. 51.

43



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