justice system on the grounds of economic expenses is not a convincing argument, especially in
view of the small total amount of money which international human rights courts cost.243
Furthermore, introducing “collective complaints” could reduce the caseload of international judi-
cial bodies. Initially there might be more cases. However, it must be kept in mind that the indi-
vidual complaint is not an adequate procedural way for large-scale individual violations or for
collective or minority rights. Not only because there are no de facto incentives to bring a com-
plaint, but also because such violations lend themselves to being treated in one case. Altruistic
NGO complaints as well as class action litigation could reduce such caseloads by bringing mul-
tiple victims together in a single proceeding.244 The same holds for actio popularis if e.g. the in-
compatibility of a law or a practice with the respective treaty is alleged (objective control).
“Collective complaints” may also further compliance with international human rights obligations
and the judgments or views of the respective bodies,245 as they raise awareness and foster public-
ity and therefore are apt to induce compliance, which would lead to a regression of (systematic)
violations. Execution of judgments or views is meant to be an integral part of the international
human rights system and to contribute to ameliorating the human rights situation. Rapid and
adequate execution has, of course, an effect on the influx of new cases: the more rapidly general
measures are taken by States Parties to execute judgments which point to a structural problem,
the fewer repetitive applications will there be.246
Using courts as a political weapon is a further argument for not admitting “collective com-
plaints”. This argument is implausible for several reasons. First, in human rights cases, as in con-
stitutional cases, political aspects often play a role. Judgments or views, if complied with, might
have political consequences. That is no reason to deny justice in the first place as human rights
have i.a. the function to protect against pragmatic policy choices. By ratifying a human rights
treaty as well as its provisions for individual complaints mechanisms and not declaring reserva-
tions, a state consents to the priority of human rights issues over considerations of political expe-
diency. In any case, purely political complaints can always be dismissed.247 Second, even if a
certain human rights violation and consequently a decision of a judicial body may have political
consequences those might also arise with purely individual complaints as the ECtHR Turkish
Cypriot cases show.248 Therefore, that is no argument against collective complaints. Third, sub-
stantive law questions are to be separated from questions of ius standi, which is a procedural
243 The Inter-American Human rights system (Court and IACHR) only takes approximately 5.5% of the total
budget of the OAS while the ECtHR takes 21.7% of the Councils’ budget see Romano, supra note 242.
244 Aceves, supra note 47, at 399 et seq.
245 Even though the implementation of the ECtHR decisions is probably better than in other regions of the
world, it still poses a problem, see Opinion No. 209/2002 on the Implementation of the Judgments of the
ECtHR, adopted by the Venice Commission, supra note 20.
246 See for the same argument Explanatory Report on Protocol No. 14, supra note 241, at para. 16.
247 See e.g. Art. 35 (3) ECHR.
248 This was e.g. debated in the Case of Loizidou v. Turkey (Appl. No. 15318/89), 1996-VI, No. 26 at 2216
Eur.Ct.H.R Grand Chamber Judgment of 18 December 1996, which dealt with i.a. the right to property under
Art. 1 of the First Protocol in the setting of Cyprus. See e.g. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bernhardt at para. 1
and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Jambrek at para. 7.
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