one is:
θ2 = γ1θ1 + γ2I1 + (1 - γ1 - γ2) θP .
For period two it is:
θ3 = min{θ2,I2,θP} .
These patterns of complementarity are polar cases that represent, in extreme form, the
empirical pattern found for cognitive skill accumulation: that substitution possibilities are
greater early in life compared to later in life.
The problem of society is to choose how much to invest in child A and child B in periods
1 and 2 to maximize total aggregate skills, θ3A + θ3B , subject to the resource constraint
I1A + I2A + I1B + I2B ≤ M , where M is total resources available for investment. Formally, the
problem is
min γ1θ1A + γ2I1A + (1 - γ1 - γ2) θPA, I2A, θPA +
min {γiθB + Y2I1B + (1 - Y1 - Y2) θB, IB, θp }
subject to: I1A + I2A + I1B + I2B ≤ M
(4.6)
When the resource constraint in (4.6) does not bind, which it does not if M is above a
certain threshold (determined by θP), optimal investments are
I1A
(Y1 + Y2) θA - YιθA
γ2
I1B
(Y1 + Y2) θB - YιθB
γ2
I2A = θPA
I2B = θPB
Notice that if child A is disadvantaged compared to B on both measures of disadvantage,
(θ1A < θ1B and θPA < θPB), it can happen that
I1A > I1B , but I2A < I2B
if
θA - θB > γ1 (θA - θΒ
P P γ1 + γ2 1 1
Thus, if parental endowment differences are less negative than child endowment differences
(scaled by γγ γ ), it is optimal to invest more in the early years for the disadvantaged and
less in the later years. Notice that since (1 - γ1 - γ2) = γP is the productivity parameter on
θP in the first period technology, we can rewrite this condition as (θA — θB) > ɪ (θA — θB).
The higher the self-productivity (γ1) and the higher the parental environment productivity,
γP , the more likely will this inequality be satisfied for any fixed level of disparity.
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