Why Managers Hold Shares of Their Firms: An Empirical Analysis



3.1 Portfolio Evidence

Table 3 reports the estimation results using portfolios with various cutoffs
for managerial ownership.

+ + + Please insert TABLE 3 about here + + +

In Panel A, the results for value-weighted portfolios of S&P 1500 firms
for various cutoffs of managerial ownership over the period 1996 to 2005
are presented. For a cutoff of 5%, we find a positive estimate for α
i that is
statistically significant at the 5% level. We find economically significant ab-
normal monthly returns of 0.68%, which translates into an annual abnormal
return of 8.52%. This result is even stronger if we examine portfolios with
higher cutoffs for managerial ownership. It increases to abnormal returns of
12.1% p.a. for a cutoff of 10% and to over 16% for a cutoff of 15%.
8 For
these higher cutoffs, abnormal returns are statistically significant at the 1%
level.

These results carry over to the S&P 500 firm universe, where we can
examine the longer period from 1994 to 2005 (Panel B). In this case, we
find abnormal returns of 9.73% p.a. for the 5% cutoff and abnormal returns
of 13.2% p.a. for the 10% cutoff. With the exception of the 15% cutoff, the
effect is always stronger than for the S&P 1500 firms in Panel A.

Overall, these results are highly significant in economic as well as statis-
tical terms. They suggest that one would have earned abnormal returns of
well above 10% p.a. by investing in firms with high managerial ownership
8We do not report results for higher cutoffs, as the number of firms that enter our
portfolio gets relatively small in these cases. For extremely high cutoffs, e.g., 25% or
higher, we are not able to find any statistically significant coefficients anymore.

10



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