not control for. However, given that we find no abnormal returns in firms
with the very characteristics of firms with high managerial ownership that
have no owner CEO, and given that CEO individual risk is idiosyncratic,
this explanation seems to be less likely. Rather, the abnormal returns might
either be an indication that markets are not fully informationally efficient,
or they might emerge as compensation for managerial effort in a rational
equilibrium (von Lilienfeld-Toal (2006) and Blonski and von Lilienfeld-Toal
(2006)). Depending on whether we assume investors to be very rational in a
strategic sense, or whether we assume them to be of limited rationality in the
sense of being unable to correctly interpret publicly available information,
one or the other explanation seems to be more likely. Other potential expla-
nations for abnormal returns of owner CEO firms, like limits to arbitrage or
liquidity concerns, appear to be less likely.
29
More intriguing information
1. Mean Variance Optimization of Non-Linear Systems and Worst-case Analysis2. Conflict and Uncertainty: A Dynamic Approach
3. Analyzing the Agricultural Trade Impacts of the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement
4. The name is absent
5. Output Effects of Agri-environmental Programs of the EU
6. REVITALIZING FAMILY FARM AGRICULTURE
7. The name is absent
8. Testing Gribat´s Law Across Regions. Evidence from Spain.
9. THE WAEA -- WHICH NICHE IN THE PROFESSION?
10. Technological progress, organizational change and the size of the Human Resources Department