The name is absent

- 11 -

the discourse preceding a decision at the ballots. At least a temporary revision of citizens’ evaluations
of policies is feasible, increasing the probability that common interests will guide the social choice.
Direct democracy hence may provide even a better chance for the development of civic virtues than
representative democracy.

2.4 Direct Democracy and a European demos

Connected to the role of discussion in direct democracy, the introduction of referenda and initiatives
at the EU level is sometimes supposed to have an additional indirect advantage. As mentioned in the
introduction, one of the most often criticised shortcomings of EU decision-making is the lack of a
European demos interpreted as a common European political conscience of the citizens in the indi-
vidual member states.¹³ Elements of direct democracy at the EU level are supposed to lead to the
formation of a European demos. This might help to develop a common policy understanding. In this
case, Switzerland is again an inspiring example. After the Swiss civil war in 1847, a federal state was
created which could not rely on a national demos: A Swiss demos did not exist then. Only cantonal
demoi could be observed. According to Hug (2000, chap. 6), the elements of direct democracy in
the Swiss constitution contributed to the development of a Swiss demos.

Hug (2000) also outlines clearly, however, that the hopes of an EU-wide referendum forming an EU
demos should not be exaggerated. Two caveats in drawing an analogy between 19^th century Swit-
zerland and the EU are particularly in place: First, elements of direct democracy might be helpful but
are neither necessary nor sufficient for a European demos to emerge. It is too little known about the
mechanisms that lead citizens to overthrow positions that are based on their narrow (national or
cantonal) interests and instead adopt more general positions (Cederman and Kraus, 2003). For
Switzerland, the empirical results on differences in tax evasion between cantons with and without ref-
erenda indicate that a referendum might shape such a transformation of interests. It might, however,
also be that national interests prevail and are exacerbated by EU-wide referenda for instance if refer-
endum outcomes frequently follow along the distinction between poor and rich member countries.
Second, it is obvious that at least in some member countries citizens are not yet ready to accept ma-
jority decisions at the EU level. Consider for instance an increase in tax rates in order to finance ad-
ditional funds for Eastern European countries on a larger scale. Within the single member states, such
a regional redistribution, say from Northern Italy to the Mezzogiorno, is (more or less) accepted by
the citizens paying for it because a national feeling of mutual solidarity exists. At the European level, a
corresponding consciousness is still lacking. Thus, at the moment a corresponding proposal would
probably be rejected by the people.

However, like in Switzerland in the 19^th century, the introduction of referenda could help to develop
such a consciousness which might help that in the long run redistributional measures would be ac-
cepted by the European citizens also at the European level. Like central bank independence is nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient but helpful for price stability, the discourse among citizens that precedes

13. See the more recent discussions in several European newspapers on the development of a European demos
in light of the geopolitical developments after the second Iraq war: J. DERRIDA and J. HABERMAS, Unsere Er-
neuerung, in: FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG No. 125, May 31, 2003, p. 33.

<<   10   11   12   13   14   15   16   >>

More intriguing information