- 21 -
cratic jurisdictions according to which policies in direct democracy more strongly follow the Wick-
sellian connection of tax prices and spending.
These arguments lead us to propose the introduction of elements of direct democracy in a future
European Constitution. The European citizens should have the possibility to decide themselves about
the future European Constitution as well as any future changes of it. Thus, we propose a mandatory,
required and binding referendum on total and partial revisions of the European Constitution.
Because we also propose that the EU gets its own value added tax revenue, the rate of which is to
be fixed in the constitution, tax increase is also subject to the mandatory referendum. In addition, we
propose a constitutional initiative, a statutory as well as a general initiative. Finally, in the case
that the EU should adopt more competencies and power and, therefore, have increased spending
needs, we propose a fiscal referendum for financially important projects.
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