The name is absent



In what follows let x 0 be taxable labor income before tax and y 0 taxable capital
income before tax. Then, a
dual tax schedule is defined by

(1)                          T(x,y) = L(x) + K(y) x+y

where L(), K() are unidimensional tax schedules. When both L(),K() are progressive3, we
say that
T (x, y) is quasi-progressive.

Consider a (finite) set of tax-payers with pre-tax labor incomes and pre-tax capital incomes
given by distributions
x = (x1, ...,xn) and y = (y1, ...,yn) respectively, where (xk,yk) are the
incomes of the tax-payer
k. Then, let x be the average pre-tax labor income, y the average
pre-tax capital income
, L be the average labor liability and K the average capital liability.
We also introduce the following initial rates,
gL = L and g K = K.

xy

We represent the dual tax schedule obtained from a dual tax schedule T (x, y) applying a
reform of type
i on the labor tax schedule and a reform of type j on the capital tax schedule
by

Li(x)                  Kj (y)

,--------------^--------------4     ,---------------^---------------4

(2)                     Ti,j(x, y) = ρiLL(x) + σiLx+ρjKK(y) +σjKy,

for i = 1, 2, 3 and j = 1, 2, 3. As an example, in the case T1,2 the parameters are ρ1L = 1 - aL,
σiL = 0, ρ1K = 1 + bK and σiK = -bK. By means of simple algebra, it is proven that the
positive (resp. negative) change ∆
Ri,j on the aggregate total 4 post-tax income when a tax
cut (resp. a tax increase) of type
Ti,j (x, y) is applied to T (x, y) is given by

(3)


∆Ri,j = ((1 - PL) L - σLx + (1 - PK) K - σKy) ∙ n.

Dividing equation (3) by (x + y) n, the yield-equivalent condition for the above tax cuts

is

(4)


R = δ


∆      ∆Li      

,---------------λ---------------4

(1 - PL) gL - σL

/


+ (1 - δ)


/      ∆Κj      ʌ

(1 - PjK) gκ - σK

/


3That is, -d (L(x)) 0, -d (K(y)) ≥ 0.

dx x       dy y

4We use total to refer to both labor and capital.



More intriguing information

1. Long-Term Capital Movements
2. CONSUMER PERCEPTION ON ALTERNATIVE POULTRY
3. Subduing High Inflation in Romania. How to Better Monetary and Exchange Rate Mechanisms?
4. The name is absent
5. The Effects of Reforming the Chinese Dual-Track Price System
6. The quick and the dead: when reaction beats intention
7. Labour Market Institutions and the Personal Distribution of Income in the OECD
8. The Variable-Rate Decision for Multiple Inputs with Multiple Management Zones
9. INSTITUTIONS AND PRICE TRANSMISSION IN THE VIETNAMESE HOG MARKET
10. The name is absent