Abstract
The focus of the paper is on issue-by-issue bargaining procedures in which parties
are allowed to differ not only in their valuations of the issues but also in their rates
of time-preference. We show that the interplay of the forces in the bargaining game
is complex and standard assumptions in the literature, such as a common discount
factor, can be strong. We investigate the SPE of the game when the order of the issues
can be changed and show that parties can have the same preferences over agendas
when they both agree over the importance of an issue or when they disagree (if corner
solutions are allowed and/or there is a difficult/urgent issue).
JEL Classification: C72, C73, C78.
Key words: Agenda, Bargaining, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.
More intriguing information
1. Towards Teaching a Robot to Count Objects2. The constitution and evolution of the stars
3. The name is absent
4. Government spending composition, technical change and wage inequality
5. TECHNOLOGY AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF PATENTS AND FIRM LOCATION IN THE SPANISH MEDICAL INSTRUMENTS INDUSTRY.
6. Effort and Performance in Public-Policy Contests
7. Computing optimal sampling designs for two-stage studies
8. Multifunctionality of Agriculture: An Inquiry Into the Complementarity Between Landscape Preservation and Food Security
9. Chebyshev polynomial approximation to approximate partial differential equations
10. The name is absent