The name is absent

contestants that consists out of those m contestants with the lowest δ values that
satisfy the following inequality:

(m — 1)δP < ^ δp for all i ∈ M and for P ∈ {ET, AA} .        (24)

j∈M

From the definition of the share function in Eq. (22) the equilibrium effort level
of contestant i can be calculated as e*(P) = z*∕α^p = s_i(Z*)Z*/αP. Inserting the
expression for Z* leads to Eq. (10).³1

B References

Bernardo, Antonio E., Eric Talley, and Ivo Welch (2000): “A Theory of
Legal Presumptions,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 16, 1-49.

Calsamiglia, Catarina (2004): “Decentralizing Equality of Opportunity,”
Working Paper.

Clark, Derek J., and Christian Riis (1998): “Contest Success Functions: An
Extension,” Economic Theory, 11, 201-204.

Corch5n, LuiS C. (2000): “On the Allocative Effects of Rent Seeking,” Journal of
Public Economic Theory, 2(4), 483-491.

Cornes, Richard, and Roger Hartley (2005): “Asymmetric Contests with
General Technologies,” Economic Theory, 26, 923-946.

Fryer, Roland G., and Glenn C. Loury (2005a): “Affirmative Action and Its
Mythology,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19.

-------  (2005b): “Affirmative Action in Winner-Take-All-Markets,” Journal of
Economic Inequality, 3, 263-280.

Fu, Quiang (2006): “A Theory of Affirmative Action in College Admissions,”
Economic Inquiry, 44, 420-428.

Holzer, Harry, and David Neumark (2000): “Assessing Affirmative Action,”
Journal of Economic Literature, 3(3), 483-568.

Kranich, Laurence (1994): “Equal Division, Efficiency, and the Sovereign Supply
of Labor,” American Economic Review, 84, 178-189.

³¹ Stein (2002) derives a similar expression in a rent-seeking framework where the contestants are
heterogeneous with respect to valuations instead of marginal costs.

25

<<   23   24   25   26   27   >>

More intriguing information