Similarly, Gramsci (1971, p. 418) argued that intellectuals must feel ‘the
elementary passions of the people’, and Freire (1972) reflected this idea within his
writings: they are peppered with references to feelings and emotions and he closely
analyses the potential emotional connections between oppressors and oppressed. The
impression given is that emotions are essentially connected to morality: as Gray (2002, p.
42) argues, ‘Morality is not a set of laws or principles. It is a feeling - the feeling of
compassion for the suffering of others’. From a social constructionist perspective,
education is a ‘moral enterprise’ because:
.„we create a contrived environment, called “curriculum and instruction”, and we attempt to
influence persons in this environment. We assume the responsibility for the influencing of
persons in the directions of our curriculum specifications, and this is essentially a moral act.
(Macdonald 1966, p.39)
The philosophical arguments for and against a ‘moral’ education in schools are too
lengthy to discuss here, but from the perspective of critical pedagogues, feelings, emotions
and morals are crucial aspects of education. The sentiment is well captured by the survivor
of a concentration camp who wrote, ‘My eyes saw„ Gas chambers built by learned
engineers„ Children poisoned by educated physicians„ My request is: help your students
become more human’ (Unknown, cited in Pring 2004, p. 24).
Praxis (Reflection, Action, Engagement and Possibility)
Praxis, meaning the ‘authentic union’ of action and reflection which leads to
conscientization (Freire 1972, p. 48), is perhaps the most distinctive element of critical
pedagogy (Fischman and McLaren 2005; Kincheloe 2008; Morrow and Torres 2002).
Freire (1972) warns educators that no real change can arise from an imbalance between
reflection and action and he terms the sacrifice of reflection ‘activism’, and the sacrifice of
action ‘verbalism’ (Freire 1972, p. 60, footnote 1). Similarly, Giroux (2003, p. 38) argues
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