Fiscal Reform and Monetary Union in West Africa

The condition for xM - xE > 0 is (F_i + b(y* - y_i )λλbν2d + c² П (bθG - dθ^β )]>0 which is

also fulfilled as long as (bθ ^G - dθ^B )>0. Again, because there is no seigniorage, s_i^E -s_i^M

Proof of Result 4:

The condition for x_i^A -x_i^M >0 is that

^λθB^ν2 ɪ (Fi ^{+ b(}y* ^- yi ))(^λdν2 ^{+ c}2 T-)>n ∑_j ^(xA ^{+ (}y* ^- yj f^{λd + θ}G)^λνν^ν2^{+ c}2^ω ).

The             condition             for             s_i^A -s_i^M >0             is             that

(F_i + b (y * - y. )λθ^εV ⁿ-1 (dθ^β — b ~)> ɪ Σ (xA + (y * — У )λν,ν₂ + c∖dθ^β - b ^θG-). Notice that
i        i i         2n               n n j j j j        12         2              n

if (nbθG - dθB )>0 the inequality reverses its sign. Hence, the comparison about structural
reforms depends not only on the distortions of country i vis-à-vis the average of the other
countries but also on the size of d.

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