for q< 1. Therefore, more capital increases consumer surplus.
We proceed in two stages, starting by maximizing CS with respect to the loan’s price,
rL ,forafixed k , which yields
∂CS
∂r L
dq ∖
∂rL (R — rL)— q =
R - 2rL + (1 - k)rD
2C
=0.
Solving the FOC yields rL = R+(1-k)rD.
We can now maximize CS with respect to the choice of capital, k. However, we know
from above that the combination of rL = ' and the highest possible k will be
optimal for borrowers. We therefore introduce the participation constraint for the bank,
that Π = q(rL — (1 — k)rD) — krE — cq2 ≥ 0. Substituting for q = rL~(2-k)rD as well as for
rL , we obtain
(R — (1 — k)rD)2
∏ = (-----( 16c ) D) — krE ≥ 0, k ≤ 1.
We can solve this for the value of k that satisfies the constraint with equality (Π =0). Since
Π is strictly convex in k, 0 ≤ k ≤ 1, and consumer surplus is increasing in k, the relevant
solution must be either the smaller root or a corner solution at k =1. The solution is then
kCS
. 8 8crE — RrD + rD — 4 JrEc (4crE — RrD + rD ) |
min ɪ----------------------rD----------------------■1 ʃ •
Note that if kCS = 1, then rL = RR.
We now check when in fact q< 1. From the definition of the optimal level of monitoring
q = min I rL (12- k)rD, 1}, we see that, for rL ≥ (1 — k)rD + 2c, q = 1. Substituting in the
optimal value for rL gives the following condition:
R +(1 — k)rD
2
≥ (1 — k)rD +2c.
The right hand side is maximized at k =0.Thus,asufficient condition for q =1is that
R — rD — 4c ≥ 0. In this case, there is no benefit in terms of greater monitoring to having
27