Flexibility and security: an asymmetrical relationship?
9. Concluding remarks
9.1. Main findings of the report
1) The flexicurity agenda attracts a number of criticisms and some of its aspects are highly ques-
tioned, not so much as regards its guiding principles — the need to strike a balance between the
flexibility needs of business and organisations, and the security needs of the workforce is not
seriously disputed- but rather for its controversial policy content and implementation. Three
are the main points of criticism:
a) it is a trade-off between unequal partners (business and labour);
b) it does not specify who pays the bill for improving the security of the workforce;
c) its success heavily relies on the soaring numbers of the precarious workforce with few (if
any) employment and social security rights.
2) Despite its shortcomings, the flexicurity agenda remains the only articulate policy agenda in
the EU, without a credible alternative. It also constitutes a definite improvement compared
to the labour market deregulation approach popular in many OECD countries. However, it is
more suitable for countries with good economic performance and strong institutions than for
countries with major structural weaknesses, segmented labour markets and residual welfare
states.
3) The success of the flexicurity policy agenda boils down to 2 fundamental requirements: re-
sources and trust. Resources to finance the costly active and passive labour market policies, and
trust to build up consensus and enable mutual concessions between the social partners. If a
country lacks either or both of these ingredients, it does not qualify for a successful policy
outcome.
4) There is no single recipe or path to follow to increase economic competitiveness and enhance
social cohesion: countries with a very different welfare regime (like, for example, Denmark
and Austria) have been successful in pursuing both goals.
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