Flexibility and security: an asymmetrical relationship?
fications, the regulation of temporary contracts, information rights of work committees and working
time arrangements (ibid.).
Although these very same exogenous factors had initially triggered off a process of coordina-
tion and social consultation in Greece also, the results were very short-lived and inconclusive. The
only instance of a somewhat successful outcome of tripartite social dialogue was the Confidence Pact
concluded in 1997, the only accord of this type ever signed in Greece.65 As soon as Greece joined
the EMU in 2001, the previous adversarial climate of controversy and intense rivalry between the
social actors was re-instated. All subsequent attempts at a tripartite social dialogue failed, owing to
the absence of a firm political commitment on specific issues from all sides. Instead, the central state
unilaterally imposed labour market and welfare reforms that were doomed to failure. However, the
regular rounds of bi-partite collective bargaining between the peak level organisations that conclude
the National General Collective Labour Agreement every year or every 2 years, act as a functional equiva-
lent to social concertation (Ioannou, 2000a). The topics on the collective bargaining agenda include
mainly wage setting, allowances, leaves (maternity, parental, holiday leaves), and less often training
issues or working time reduction. More general issues (the so-called institutional ones) are also ad-
dressed. Unlike the other 3 countries however, unions in Greece have persistently refused to include
flexibility issues in the collective bargaining agenda.
6.3.4. The effectiveness of labour market reforms
The measure of success of labour market reforms is the degree to which they produce the an-
ticipated positive effects on job creation, improved labour productivity and enhanced flexibility for
companies and workers alike. Mainstream legislative labour market initiatives tell only part of the
story. How these regulations are re-defined at the lower levels of negotiations or implemented at the
workplace can reveal a great deal of deviation from the original aims, as company practices often
diverge significantly from institutional regulations.
65 This pact is commonly seen as rather ineffective, mainly because such essential policy fields as wage bargaining, taxa-
tion and social security were excluded from its agenda. Moreover, the peak organisation of SMEs refused to sign it.
The fate of the pact reflects general problems of the social dialogue in Greece (Ioannou, 2000a).
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