These assumptions have been to a certain extent validated by research
into the successes and failures of past aid policies. Donor thinking has
gradually become more sophisticated over the years, reflecting the cumula-
tive insight of large numbers of evaluations and other studies, both by donor
institutions and by independent researchers. But quite a lot of the thinking
on the role of civil society and participation is based on Western experi-
ences, where participation and the growth of civil society has been (more or
less) an endogenous process that evolved over centuries. Third World coun-
tries however now face considerable external pressure (under the form of the
PRSP guidelines) to increase the role, weight and influence of CSOs.
So the fundamental question is: what gains can be expected from
externally imposed participation. Will civil society be strengthened? Can
one strengthen civil society as if it were a homogeneous unity? Or is it
more about strengthening certain parts of civil society? If so, which parts
are to be strengthened? Can donors “buy” participation? Is civil society in
these HIPC countries prepared for its new task as a high-level negotiator?
Have NGOs and other actors the expertise to interact with government on
sometimes highly technical matters? Do actors involved in the PRSP have
a mandate from the rest of the not-for-profit civil society to speak on their
behalf? Can urban-based highly educated NGO officials represent the poor,
especially in ethnically and culturally highly fragmented societies? Even if
civil society is representative and up to its task, is the government serious
in seeking its involvement? Will government propose genuine participation,
rather than try to placate the donors with a semblance of the real thing? Even
if the answers up to this point are all in the positive, do we have guarantees
that such participation will be instrumental in achieving other developmen-
tal goals? More specifically, will participation bring about more account-
ability, ownership, and effectiveness? In addition, will it do so in ways that
are institutionally robust? How does such civil society participation in fact
square with the political process? Will fragile democracies not be under-
mined when unelected civil society actors perform some of the basic func-
tions of parliament, and will this not jeopardize the sought after long-term
effects of more accountable and representative government? Obviously, the
range and scope of these questions is quite formidable, and the aim of our
paper is more modest than to try to answer them all. Yet donors, led by the
World Bank, act as if they have the answers. In the case of Bolivia in par-
ticular, weak points are being acknowledged and lip service is being paid to
the difficulty of securing genuine participation, but the overriding message
is that the participatory dimension of PRSP process in Bolivia has been quite
successful, and that other countries can learn from it, if not by imitation,
then at least by adaptation3.
3 In this paper we focus on the
Bolivian case. The broader
research project we are working
on is a comparative research in
which the Bolivian experience
will be compared with Nicara-
gua and Rwanda. Bolivia was
one of the first countries to go
through the PRSP-process. The
We have serious misgivings about the optimistic assertions that civil
society participation will trigger off better political performance and more
accountability, more ownership, and increased effectiveness. In this paper,
we set out our doubts. We do not question that intensive participation is a
sign of a mature developed society, nor that it constitutes a desirable goal
4 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05