The name is absent



3. Changes in provision with delegated budgets

I don’t think locally we’ve got the range of choice, because locally there are so very few providers.
And perhaps that’s an issue that hadn’t been practically thought through when delegation
occurred. As a head, if we can get better value for the children, it’s about choice and diversity
but in fact you have a very limited pool. It might actually mitigate against that.

3.24 At least two LEAs reported similar concerns in relation to their central contracts. Both
had fears that the lack of competition would limit the field when their catering contracts
came up for re-tendering. One officer commented that the LEA was ‘
worried that with the
limited market, we could end up with a worse deal than we now have’
. The other had delayed re-
tendering in the hope that the situation would improve.

Summary

3.25 The study found a very diverse response from schools in the extent to which they had
seen delegation as an opportunity to change their meal provision. Many schools were
obviously satisfied with what they were already providing to their pupils, hence in those
authorities that had not delegated across the board to all primary schools, the take up of
funding was relatively rare. If governors had the opportunity to stay with a central
contract that supplied meals at a cost the school could afford, then there would be little
reason to have made changes.

3.26 However, schools may well have been discouraged from change not because they were
totally happy with the current service, but through fear of what might happen if they
did. For some head teachers and governing bodies, Pandora’s box was waiting on the
other side of the kitchen door with staffing and legislation issues to resolve and more
financial worry. It is not, therefore, surprising that for schools for which the service
was going to become a financial drain, the temptation to close the door permanently
was overwhelming.

3.27 Despite the ‘no change’ situation in many schools, there is substantial evidence of other
schools being entrepreneurial in their use of the delegated budgets, renegotiating their
contracts or seeking out totally new sources of supply. Schools with profitable cafeterias
were able to make advantageous individual contracts with suppliers, gaining a share of the
profits or refurbishment of the kitchens and dining areas. Whilst this gain for individual
schools might have been at a cost to other less profitable schools previously subsidised
via a central contract, this was perhaps the best value that delegation was intended to
achieve.

3.28 Two key factors identified schools that successfully undertook their own in-house
provision and those who found new sources of supply. Firstly, head teachers and the
governing bodies were determined to maintain a meals service as part of the school day
and if necessary, to subsidise the service with additional funds beyond that delegated for
meals by the LEA. Secondly, being able to bring projects to fruition relied to some
extent on the serendipity of practical details, e.g., being able to find a cook in areas of
high employment and high wages (or alternatively in isolated locations), identifying
sources of funding to upgrade kitchens and equipment, having a conveniently placed
local supplier. Even with the most determined of governors, it may not be possible to
overcome all the practical obstacles in every school location.

23



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