Endogenous Heterogeneity in Strategic Models: Symmetry-breaking via Strategic Substitutes and Nonconcavities

[34] Nelson, R. (1991), Why do firms differ and why does it matter? Strategic
Management Journal, 12, 61-74.

[35] Reynolds, S. and B. Wilson (2000), Bertrand-Edgeworth competition, de-
mand uncertainty and asymmetric outcomes, Journal of Economic Theory,
92, 122-141.

[36] Roller L-H and B. Sinclair-Desgagné (1996), On the heterogeneity of firms,
European Economic Review, 77, 402-420.

[37] Rumelt, R., Schendel, D. and D. Teece (1991), Strategic management and
economics, Strategic Management Journal, 12, 5-29.

[38] Salant, S.W. and G. Schaffer (1998), Optimal asymmetric strategies in
research joint ventures, International Journal of Industrial Organization,
16, 195-208.

[39] Salant, S.W. and G. Shaffer (1999), Unequal treatment of identical agents
in Cournot equilibrium, American Economic Review, 83, 585-604.

[40] Schelling, T. (1960), The strategy of conflict, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge.

[41] Shaked, A. and J. Sutton (1982), Relaxing price competition through prod-
uct differentiation, Review of Economic Studies, 49(1), 3-13.

[42] Shapiro, C. (1989), The theory of business strategy, RAND Journal of
Economics, 20, 125-137.

[43] Stengel, von B. (2003), Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games,
CDAM Research Report LSE-CDAM-2003-13.

[44] Tabuchi, T. and J.-F. Thisse (1995), Asymmetric equilibria in spatial com-
petition, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 13, 213-227

[45] Tarski, A. (1955), A lattice-theoretic fixed point theorem and its applica-
tions, Pacific Journal of Mathematics, 5, 285-309.

46

<<   43   44   45   46   47   >>

More intriguing information