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contacts previously established in the build-up to the single market programme and the
fact that both actors shared the goal of making European industry globally competitive, it
is not surprising that the Commission felt comfortable involving capital in the form of the
ERT and UNICE in subsequent MCR negotiations. Taking into account Majone’s (1991)
claim that “the real costs of most regulatory programmes are borne directly by the firms
and individuals who have to comply with them,” it seems little surprise that during the
development of the MCR economic elites and the Commission proved once again to be
natural policy partners during negotiation of the MCR.
In terms of specific dynamics when the MCR was negotiated, then, actors
representative of larger capital interests (UNICE and ERT) as well as the European
Commission would thus act interdependently and seek the establishment of merger
control based on their own self-supporting goals. From this perspective, the ‘community’
revolving around both actors can be defined as ‘macro’ in the sense that they were
representative of the general interests of capital and that of main Directorate Generals
within the Commission, including Competition, Economic and Financial Affairs,
Industry, Transport, and Internal Markets and Financial Services which all keenly
supported the idea of merger control in order to create a truly single, integrated European
market (Armstrong and Bulmer 1998, Interview 2001b).
Regarding the calculation of interests of the Commission, in general, and DG
Competition, in particular, these actors warmly welcomed merger control regulation
based on interests to extend regulatory power. As Peterson and Bomberg (1999) state,
“the Commission (could) use the MCR to set policy where it has been unable to before.”
Moreover, along the lines of Coen (1998) and the Commission (2002), great weight was
given by the Commission to discuss the nature of the regulation along with those firms
prepared to establish some form of ‘European credibility.’ By appearing to accommodate
capital actors’ demand for the creation of a ‘level playing field’ and a ‘one-stop shop’ for
merger control, the Commission was successful in securing a ‘strong’ policy partner and
expanding its policy competence via a new area where it would be the sole EU
institutional actor.
Turning to business’ overall interests, a codified directive on merger control
would not only aid capital in attaining its goals of reorganisation and consolidation in the