of how the actors and their self-supporting motivations interact in the decision-making
process during MCR implementation. It will be argued that this particular ‘micro-
community’ depicts an insulated relationship between both specific-firm actors and
members of DG Competition’s Merger Task Force (MTF) operating in a regulatory
policy environment where the actors are interdependent and autonomous, while their
relationship combines elements of conflict and cooperation. Because this ‘micro’
community found at the implementation phase is representative of more specific players
within the ‘macro’ one, both communities are related. However, it is suggested that the
outcomes of the ‘micro’ level may effectively change the nature of decisions originally
taken by the ‘macro’ community, pointing to the dynamic nature of the relationship. It is
contended that in order to explain the development of this ‘micro-community,’ attention
must be focused on the overlapping, self-supporting private interests of both sets of
actors, which ultimately served as a strong foundation for working together, while
preventing other social actors such as organised labour from participating. The
conclusions highlight the main findings and the relevance of the work to students of
comparative European politics.
The Formulation of the MCR: The ‘Macro’ Merger Policy Community
The 1990 Merger Control Regulation defined a merger as the consolidation of two
or more firms, characterised as being one of three types: horizontal, vertical, or
conglomerate. Horizontal mergers are defined as those where rivals in the same market
merge; vertical combine two firms having potential or actual buyer-seller relationships;
and conglomerate see a consolidation of firms that are neither sellers in the same market,
nor involved in a buyer-seller relationship (Viscusi et al. 1995, 195-215). The MCR
gives the Merger Task Force (MTF), a sub-bureaucratic actor within Directorate General
Competition of the European Commission, the exclusive power to investigate and stop
mergers with a Community dimension.8 The focus of the regulation is dominance
(Article 2(3)):