actually work against the public interest.6 The assumption in private interest theory is
that all individuals, in or out of government, pursue their own self-interests: as consumers
seek to maximize their utility and firms seek to maximize their profits, policy-makers
seek to maximize their own institutional power and policy objectives. This suggests that
the observed differences between public and private choices emerge not because
individuals adopt different behavioural objectives in the two settings, but rather because
the constraints on behaviour are different (Laver 1997).
Seeking to transcend these two main insufficiencies, this paper offers insights into
the theoretical classification of policy communities while attempting to explain why they
develop. More specifically, it examines the development of EU-level merger control
policy communities at both the formulation and implementation phases and utilizes
private interest theory as an explanatory variable. Analysis of merger policy is justified
on two grounds beyond the fact that few existing political science-based works analyse
merger policy. First, mergers have increasingly occurred given economic globalisation
and, as such, their study offers the opportunity to examine how transnational actors may
operate in the context of supranational governance. In particular, since the late 80s there
has been a massive merger wave across Europe, with the total number of merger and
acquisition (M&A) transactions involving EU firms increasing nearly threefold over 13
years since 1987 with the peak occurring in 19907 - the same year the Merger Control
Regulation (MCR) came into force as discussed below. Secondly, this analysis also
potentially allows for clear insights into policy developments in the EU political system,
including areas of competition policy where firms are the objects of regulation, as seen in
restrictive practices and monopoly policy, and other areas such as redistributive policies.
Such lessons may offer insights and are potentially transferable to other political systems.
The next section examines the formulation of the 1990 MCR. Emphasised here is
the emergence of what we refer to as a ‘macro-community’ comprised of two main sets
of actors - officials of different DGs in the Commission and representatives of capital -
that acted in unison at this stage of policy development. The evidence suggests that these
actors had self-supporting, interdependent, private interests and pursued political activity
that was ultimately isolated from the general public and other social actors. Thereafter, a
more detailed analysis of the Nestlé/Perrier decision of 1992 is made, offering a picture