formulation of supranational regulatory initiatives, such as merger rules, state aid rules
and CAP, the exact same as those that participate when such regulations are
implemented? If not, how are the actors related and their relationships better theorised?
The second, perhaps more important, insufficiency in the community literature is
that it offers description without explanation. Heywood and Wright (1997, 88) argue that
“the most telling criticisms are that most of the approaches rest on imprecise definitions
and that its analytical insight is purchased only at the cost of ever-greater descriptive
detail”. Dowding (1995) further contends that the network approach presents a
sophisticated map of policy formulation and co-ordination, rather than an explanatory
model with predictive capacity. Thatcher (1998, 403) also suggests that responses to the
question of ‘why do such networks/communities arise in the first place,’ such as
fragmentation of governments and interdependence of governments on interest groups,
are too vague.
Although the existing literature has not fully tested this idea, one may argue that
an avenue for explanation for the development and persistence of communities may be
found focusing on a (second) set of literature broadly defined as ‘private interest theory.’
The use of this theory in the realm of regulatory policies, and antitrust policy in
particular, has its roots in what has become known as the ‘Virginia School’ as reflected in
the works of Buchanan (1972), Tullock (1967) and Tollison (1983, 1989). This literature
was developed as a reaction to those ‘public interest’ theorists who argued that policies
toward business were formulated and executed by well-informed public servants who
maximized public welfare.5 Private interest theory argues that there is an inherent tension
in ideas raised by public interest scholars: on the one hand, market power/failure arises
from the activities of self-interested firms seeking to maximize their own private benefits
(Stigler 1975), and, on the other, government intervention by public servants promotes
general welfare. Given these inherent tensions, wherein in one setting individuals are
assumed to be self-interested and in the other they are assumed to be publicly-interested,
an interpretation pointing fully to ‘private interests’ suggests that while policy may be
employed to promote the public’s interest, it may also further the private interests of all
actors - including policymakers themselves - potentially at the expense of others
(Shepsle and Bonchek 1997, 223). From this perspective, antitrust enforcement may